NAWAZ SHARIF'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE NATION - MAY 14, 2014

BY

DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT AND ZAMURRAD AWAN

SIX LESSONS OF GAZA ONSLAUGHT

THE NATION - OCT 01, 2014

DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT AND ZAMURRAD AWAN

Musharraf – It’s Time To Quit!

Syed Farooq Hasnat

- May 24th, 2007

Pervez Musharraf. Even the most well-versed pundits of Pakistani politics did not expect the turmoil currently plaguing the country.

General Pervez Musharraf, who has ruled Pakistan for nearly eight years without much resistance, has suddenly found himself in the middle of a crisis. The government mishandled an otherwise routine judicial matter right from the start. First, the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was suspended. Next, the order was hurriedly withdrawn since it contradicted the spirit of Pakistan’s constitution. Then, the chief justice and his family were virtually put under house arrest, which provoked sharp condemnations from across the country.

Chaudhry has become a symbol of resistance against Musharraf’s dictatorial rule. A mass movement supporting Justice Chaudhry is spearheaded by lawyers and supported by opposition political parties and civil rights groups.

When the army staged a coup in October 1999, the major political parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had lost public support because of rampant corruption and misrule during their administrations. General Musharraf took advantage of public apathy and exiled both leaders - although for different reasons.

In recent months the high court under Chief Justice Chaudhry showed its strength when it dealt with habeas corpus issues and other matters that linked the government to corruption. In the past, the military governments easily intimidated Pakistan’s high courts. Notable among the court decisions that went against the regime was the issue of missing persons. At the time, it was feared that many Pakistani citizens were being handed over to the US intelligence agencies without providing valid evidence that they were involved in any unlawful acts. The second matter, which irked the military government, was the court’s nullification of the sale of the Pakistan Steel Mill, which was to be sold to a private party known to the Prime Minister, at a much cheaper price than its market value.

The Supreme Court’s new attitude is putting Musharraf on edge ahead of the 2007 elections, which are important for his survival as Pakistan’s leader. The court still has a number of contentious issues to decide that also make the military leadership nervous: Can the president be elected twice by the same assembly? Could the president remain in military uniform and still be president? Should the two exiled leaders Bhutto and Sharif be allowed to take part in the elections? There are also questions about the transparency of the elections and the dual nationality of the prime minister.

With the threat of an independent judiciary, Musharraf removed the chief justice, but he miscalculated the resilience of the judge who refused to resign. Musharraf also miscalculated the level of widespread public support for the opponent of his military rule. Street protests also exposed the vulnerability of his ruling Q League (the Pakistan Muslim League).

This is the first time in Pakistan’s 60-year history that a mass movement has been launched without the leadership of political parties. Now it’s the politicians who are following the dictates of the public mood and the legal community. This is also the first time that the army as an institution has been the target of public resentment. Previously, it was individual military personalities who were singled out for criticism.

Pakistan is not, however, politically “fragmented” along the lines of moderates and fundamentalists, as Musharraf has claimed. Recent events illustrate that the real contention is between those pushing for democratic reforms and those who support continued military rule.

Initially, the Musharraf regime thought public resentment would fizzle, mainly because of the summer heat and the political apathy that has prevailed for the last eight years. Instead, with every passing day the situation has worsened for Musharraf. Unprecedented public support for the judge and opposition to the government was apparent on May 5 when Justice Chaudhry was showered with rose petals by supporters as he journeyed from Islamabad to Lahore. The trip, which usually takes about five hours, took more than 26 hours as he greeted supporters along the way. Many had waited overnight to greet their new “symbol of resistance.”

On May 12, when the Chief Justice visited Karachi at the invitation of Sindh High Court Bar Association, an ethnic group, MQM — a staunch supporter of General Musharraf — blocked the judge from addressing the lawyers gathered there. Karachi erupted. After three days of riots, 42 people had died and more than 150 were injured. On May 16, General Musharraf gave his full backing to the MQM and showed no sympathy for the killings. The Karachi carnage has further weakened his military rule.

The general is left with few options for survival. He and his ministers have hinted at imposing a state of emergency or even Martial Law. He specifically stated that he is ready for extra constitutional measures to enhance his stay in power. But the mood of the people shows that such tactics will face widespread and stiff public resistance.

The only option left for General Musharraf is to form a neutral interim government and to hold free and open parliamentary elections. It’s time for him to quit - the army and the presidency.

BUSH TARGETS IRAN

February 17, 2007

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

Ever since the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran, the Bush administration hyped up its aggressive rhetoric towards that country, thus adding tensions to the already volatile region.

According to prudent opinions, including the US Congress, it is desired that the Bush administration and its European allies should engage Iran in a meaningful diplomacy, so that a mutually agreeable understanding can be reached. On the contrary, for last few months the Bush administration has exerted tremendous pressure on Iran - militarily, financially and politically.

In his January 29 interview on NPR (National Public Radio), Bush said that, “If Iran escalates its military action in Iraq to the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi people, we will respond firmly.” Immediately after this tough talk, a case was made by the military officials in Iraq that Iran provides deadly explosives to the “insurgents”, who are responsible for the killing of the American troops.

However, the Bush administration’s charge was met with scepticism by the media and the Congress. Amanda Johnson responded in the New York Times by saying: “What we should be shocked by is the Bush administration’s attempts to create yet another pretext for an unnecessary war, this time possibly with Iran”. On the other hand, Iran dismissed the accusations saying that the United States has already “decided on a policy and is trying to fabricate evidence if it cannot find one.”

The belligerent attitude of President Bush goes against the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, commissioned by the US Congress. The Group asked for a dialogue with Iran to further settle such hotspots of the Middle East, like Iraq, Lebanon and above all the Palestinian issue. The administration’s aggressive posture is also against the wishes of the public opinion, which is against any further surge of hostilities in the region.

Highly sceptical of the intensions of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, the newly elected Democratic Congress decided to exert their part of the authority in the decision making process. In numerous Congressional Committee hearings, the members repeatedly issued caution to the Bush administration to refrain from hostilities against Iran. It has become quite obvious that on Iran the country has conflicting views.

There is a strong suspicion that if not stopped by the Congress, under one pretext or the other, the Bush administration is geared to go beyond just imposing UNSC sanctions against Iran. President’s long record of hostile attitude towards Iran goes back to his State of the Union speech of January 2002. In that address he had called Iran as a part of the “axis of evil” and condemned those “axis” countries for the alleged support for international terrorism and their “despotic” governments. The term by itself is a misnomer as no joint planning or coordination exists between the four mentioned countries – Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea, in their policies to support international terrorism. Nor was any evidence provided by President Bush to prove his allegation. Nevertheless, the rhetoric never ceased.
Hardly, a year before these serious charges Iran had held fair and free presidential elections, in which Mohammad Khatami, a moderate was re-elected as the President by a wide margin. To reduce the tensions, in 2003 the Iranian President proposed a comprehensive talks with the Bush administration on all issues of content. As according to the recent Washington Post report of February 14, this message was ignored and an opportunity was missed for the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The neocons in the Bush administration were too obsessed with Iran to pick up a conflict.

In recent months Iran had to face two pressures from the United States. First on their nuclear programme and when things got bad in Iraq, various allegations of interference were leveled against Iran. Many in the US argue that Bush administration does not have any concrete evidence of Iran’s interference in the Iraq conflict. The Iranian officials point out to the fact that their interference in Iraq will have negative repercussions on their country and therefore would not like to see Iraq being destabilised. Secondly, the Iraqi government has fairly good relations with the Iranians and it would be illogical to undermine such a regime in Iraq.

The remaining two years of the Bush administration will be testing for the American people as well as for the world community. Although the Democrat Congress will exercise its function of checks and balances but the President has the ability to create crises by improvising various methods or by creating conditions, in which the Congress has no option but to go along with the chief executive. Analogy can also be drawn with the failing of the US policy in Vietnam in the late 1960s, when President Nixon attacked Cambodia, without the knowledge of the Congress. Sensing the danger, the Washington Post in its editorial of February 13 opined that “before things get any more out of hand, President Bush needs to make his intentions toward Iran clear. And Congress needs to make it clear that this time it will be neither tricked nor bullied into supporting another disastrous war”.

Experience in Iraq and even Afghanistan demonstrates that superpower has its limitations and that the resistance can be much more stiff and lethal than anticipated. Iran is a large country with over 60 million population and is also more united and motivated than its two neighbours. Furthermore, any misadventure against Iran can prompt that country to destabilise the already precarious Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, Iran has a sufficient leverage in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East and can create serious and long lasting problems for the United States.

In the interest of world peace and for America’s own sake, the US Congress and the people are likely to restrain the Bush administration and its neocon allies. The people of the United States stand for a dialogue, as the Baker-Hamilton Report recommends. It is the best way to resolve the issues and conflicts in the Middle East region.

THE ARAB WORLD NEEDS MORE POLITICAL REFORMS

Dr Syed Farooq Hasnat argues that unless the political institutions of the conservative Arab countries are based on popular will, they will remain fragile


The News International, Monday, December 2, 1991


The main weakness of the Arab side of the Persian Gulf is the inability to adopt a viable system for governing their societies. The strength or weakness of a country is judged by the level of participation of its people in the policy making process. Developments that we are witnessing today in the Arab world are only one side of the picture; these reveal only the economic side of the spectrum while ignoring the other vital aspects of institution building - political and security. Although long time back it was realised by some that the expansion of economic growth alone does not sufficiently reflect peoples' aspirations, nevertheless, the process of institution building has more or less remained underdeveloped, or the advancement of semi-matured political bodies has been curtailed.

Important political events such as the Iranian revolution expedited these developments, and both positive and negative reactions came from the elites ruling these countries as well as the people living there. For example under the popular pressure to further expand the powers of the already existing parliament in Kuwait, the reconvened parliament was dissolved in 1986 and in June 1990, i.e., on the eve of the Iraqi invasion, and was replaced by a nominated parliament with much less powers.

Encouraging news came from the Arab countries of the Gulf, when both Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman announced that they were ready to establish some kind of representative councils for their respective nations. On November 14th of this year, Sultan Qaboos bin Said appointed a 59 members Assembly at the national level. These members though serve for three years, their term can be extended by the Sultan. The members are elected through a unique method - best suited to the nature of the tribal society of Oman. Three names are sent by prominent religious and community members to the government and then one of them is finally chosen by the Sultan.

Although the "National Assembly" is limited in its functions, it still can be considered a step forward in the right direction. The new legislative body has been given powers to question the government ministers about the functioning of their respective departments, thus adding a responsibility of accountability to the Council. The Assembly has been given powers to advise the government but would have no authority to make laws or to inspect the activities of the ruling elite. The decree issued on this occasion said, “The Consultative Council should help the government in all matters concerning the Omani society." This representative body has replaced the State Consultative Council (SCC) which was established exactly a decade ago - wholly appointed and with limited functions. The Sultan promised to give more representation to the Omanis few months after the Iraqis had invaded Kuwait in August, 1990.

In a similar development, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia announced that by the beginning of the next year (1992) his country would have a representative body. It may be recalled that on May 18th, a petition signed by 500 Saudis was presented to the King (though who presented it included religious scholars as well as members of clergy), urging him to establish a consultative body that could involve more people in the affairs of the government. It was also requested to introduce reforms in the kingdom, in line with the Islamic principles of democracy and justice.

The expansion of services - as a result of oil revenues - in the Saudi society gave way to the formulation of a Majlis al-Wuzura (Council of Ministers) in October, 1953. The decree that was issued at that occasion recognised that, "because of the increase in the number of obligations and the diversification of the responsibilities placed upon the state," the Council of Ministers had to be established”. Another institution was established in 1955, on a model of a High Court where people could go for appeal. Also, an amendment was made in 1956 whereby complaints against any government organization were allowed to be heard by the Court.

With the advent of more oil wealth in the 1970s, the seven Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region - Oman; Saudi Arabia; UAE; Qatar; Bahrain; Kuwait and Iraq - began to modify their financial structure. This was accompanied by adjustments made in the socio-legal and administrative systems. Old concerns, it seemed, had started to give way to the new requirements, and the system itself registered a discernible change in these societies. The change did not follow a uniform pattern, as one society advanced ahead of the other in various aspects - depending on the nature of the existent structures.

The other catalyst was the readiness of the ruling elite to grant more participation in the decision making apparatus.

Most Persian Gulf states however, in the past remained backward and hence unable to confront the socio-political demands of the changes taking place in and around them. The basic Islamic democratic values were ignored and crude traditions were adopted for the convenience of the administrators.

It must be mentioned here that the Kuwaiti experience with the parliamentary reforms goes back to December, 1961 when elections were held to elect a 20 member Constituent Assembly. The non-party elections with limited franchise - in which women, illiterates and naturalized Kuwaitis were kept out of the political process - were held to elect a national assembly in January 1963. Once again in January 1971, the people of Kuwait were asked to choose 50 members for the Majils and a good number of 184 candidates participated in the elections. The parliament lasted till August 29, 1976. Interestingly, the Iranian revolutionary influence was blamed for the demands of the people for increased powers of the 1986 parliament.

But it seems that the Kuwaiti people themselves, more than anything else, are the basic compulsions for political reforms. Under pressure from the opposition, the Amir of Kuwait issued a decree according to which elections to the new National Assembly would be held in October 1992. The popular opinion in post-Gulf war Kuwait is for political rights. Even members of the royal family are vocal in this respect. Rasha Al Sabah, assistant director of the Kuwait University and a member of the ruling family, recently said that in the future legislative assembly, women should be given the political rights to vote and be elected in the forthcoming elections. She forcefully pleaded her case by saying: "Many women were out on the streets resisting Iraq's occupation when some men were hiding at home." The demand by the Kuwaiti population for the restoration of democratic institutions in their country has been an important feature of the country's politics since Iraq's defeat in February, 1991. A memorandum was presented by six main parties to the Amir on April 1991 asking to allow the functioning of the legalized political parties; establish an independent judiciary and a free press besides other political reforms.

It goes without saying that unless political reforms are introduced in these Arab countries, and political instructions based on the popular will, the safety of these societies would remain frail and vulnerable to disintegration from within.

Echoes of Iraq Study Group Report

January 09, 2007

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

Ever since James Baker and Lee Hamilton presented their bipartisan report to President Bush, the ongoing debate about Iraq increased manifold. The Iraq Study Group Report encouraged even those, who were hesitant to take definite stance on the Iraq war and to articulate their views in public. Prominent amongst them being, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. In an interview with CBS (Face the Nation), Powell opposed Bush administration’s expected plans to increase US troops in Iraq and said that the US government should instead talk directly with Iran and Syria, to stabilise the Middle Eastern region. He was joined by the incoming Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, who expressed similar views. The senator went on to say that he would oppose President Bush’s plan to accelerate the war in Iraq and would obstruct any effort to increase the already 140,000 troops present in Iraq. No matter how belligerent the Bush administration would like to be in Iraq, it will face a stiff resistance from the Democratic dominated 110 Congress, which is being convened on January 4, 2007.

The American people gave their decision against the continuation of war in Iraq, by defeating the Republican Party in the midterm congressional elections. This change led to a number of questions and options regarding the worsening situation in Iraq. However, the details and the kind of course, which the administration could adopt will be debated in the coming weeks and months. President Bush reacted to the report with caution but indicated that he regarded the findings of the report worth examining. However, his later meetings with the State Department and Pentagon officials indicate that his future course of action would not conform to the recommendations of this report. Although the report was commissioned by the US Congress, but it has no binding on the administration to implement, and it only has an advisory capacity. The strength of the report comes from the fact that all its ten members are persons of high caliber and above all it is bipartisan - half of the 10 members from each side of the political spectrum. The committee was chaired by James Baker, a former Secretary of State under President George H W Bush and Lee Hamilton was the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House International Relations Committee from early 1970s to 1993. Its members include Supreme Court retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor; William J Perry, a former Secretary of Defence in the 1990s and now Professor at Stanford University and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State under President George H W Bush.

Different points of view are examined in this report; therefore it is considered by the American public as a consensus, representing all shades of opinion. Part of the report recognises this fact and says that the “US foreign policy is doomed to failure – as is any course of action in Iraq – if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus.” This report in summary recommends that the American troops must come back in the first quarter of 2008. Although, no exact timetable is provided but many see it a kind of a time line which the US government should adopt. President Bush, on the other hand insist that there should be no time table and that the troops should only come back from Iraq, “after the job is done”. The administration can choose to ignore the advised crises management methods, but the report will certainly impact a new kind of pressure on the decision makers. After the recommendations of the report were announced, 70 per cent of the American people favoured military disengagement in Iraq. According to the NBC and Wall Street Journal survey, “seven in 10 say they want the new Congress to pressure the White House to begin bringing troops home within six months.”

In recent weeks, President Bush has been more forthcoming, in putting forward his plan, to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 30,000 to 40,000, for the purpose of taking control of the deteriorating situation. This is not what the report suggests. A veteran of Vietnam War, Congressman John Murtha asks the question that since the “United States has already lost the Iraq war”, therefore “what’s the point in sending another 40,000 troops?” Secondly, Bush administration’s belligerent posture towards Iran in recent Security Council sanctions indicate that his administration is not interested in incorporating regional powers like Iran and Syria, in any peace plan for the region. This attitude is contrary to the recommendations of the report which pleads with the administration to involve these two countries for any meaningful peace in Iraq and even to solve the Palestinian and Lebanese issues.

There is a widespread conviction amongst the Americans that the US forces are not going to achieve victory in Iraq and that the course must be changed, the troops brought back home and that the Bush administration should refrain from any such invasions, in the future. These are supplemented by a feeling that the war in Iraq was mishandled and mismanaged. Right actions were not taken at a right time and that the involvement in Iraq has reduced the American capacity to use its influence, elsewhere. The report in fact reflects the general view of the American public.

President Bush has lowered his criteria of victory and now he speaks about the bringing back of the troops, after “they finish their job” in Iraq. Too many observe this position of President Bush remains open-ended and conveys different meanings to different people. But at the same time he remains adamant that desired results will be achieved and to quote his favourite phrase, “the job will be done.” It is speculated that in the next few weeks he will announce his “new course” for Iraq.

Even if the recommendations of the Iraq Report are accepted, the exit of the American forces can not be sudden – it will be in stages, making certain that there is a façade of peace at least in the city of Baghdad. There will also be a desperate effort to train the Iraqi army and police, at an acceptable level. The Iraq Report also desires that the Iraqi people should be prepared to take over the responsibilities of their country.

There is at least one point of agreement between the report and the Bush administration. Both desire that Iraqi security forces and the political institutions are developed on the premises that they can be on their own, without any external help.

The opponents of the presence of the American troops in Iraq are of the view that it will be possible only, if a time table is forced upon the Iraqi government. They believe that if a time frame is not provided then the Iraqis will continue to rely more and more on the Americans, which in turn would obstruct their genuine efforts, to strength their institutions.

Since there is an indication that the American forces are expected to leave Iraq in 2008, therefore the Iraqis will have to expedite a governing system for their country. Iraq has been battered and destabilised by the shabby invasion and it will take plenty of effort and leadership to mend the damaged society.

Pakistan’s missing opportunities

JORDAN TIMES, THURSDAY-FRIDAY, MARCH 23-24, 1995



By

Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat


RECENT INFIGHTING in Karachi received mixed reactions. On the one hand it made the opponents of Pakistan gloat with joy. On the other, countries like Jordan expressed sympathy and concern, hoping that the violent conflict would subside soon. While the unabated violence went on, a number of questions are being raised, relating to nearly all aspects of the Pakistani society. Pakistani commentators are divided in their interpretation of the situation. Some say that the authorities have not used enough force to end the violence, while others maintain that it was the arbitrary use of force that led to the present situation.

The explanation to the cause of the strife in the urban centers of Pakistan however, deserves a much more careful analysis. The dilemma has to be assessed in a perspective that is based on an understanding of developing societies that are composed of multiethnic and lingual communities. The violence has at least two causes. First, it is the result of the gradually attained defects in the administrative management of the country and second, it was escalated by the lack of the determination on behalf of the political leadership to improve the country’s infrastructure up to the demands of the day. More broadly speaking, the Pakistani domestic conflict administrative management of the country and second, it was escalated by the lack of the determination on behalf of the political leadership to improve the country’s infrastructure up to the demands of the day. More broadly speaking, the Pakistani domestic conflict has to be analyzed within the framework of a multiple of factors, ranging from the external pressures to that of the readjustment in the domestic institutions.

This situation could not have surfaced at a worse time, when in the post-cold war era, developing countries and regional groupings are striving to attract the much needed investment from abroad. It came at a time when Multinational Corporation are planning enterprises in the developing countries, where the requirement of a cheap labor can be met. Pakistan has an advantage in this regard of having a fairly large trained labor force. This also at a time when Pakistan is being pressurized to “roll-back” its peaceful program, and to subject itself to verification under the terms of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition the U.S. is holding back on the delivery of the remaining F-16s it sold to Pakistan and whose full price has been paid, and is also imposing economic restrictions on the country.

On top of tract, the Pakistani private sector has not as yet replaced the bulky and highly inefficient public sector. Disintegrated sate enterprises still hold ground, making matters more difficult for the transformation. The required changes are to be made in all branches of the machinery – health, education, transportation, industry, agriculture and even communications and railway.

Success stories of the late 20th century – Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia were, in the 1960s and 1970s, on the same level of development as that of Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan was a role model for these countries, both in agricultural as well as industrial development in those days. One would like to remember the days when Pakistan became a favorite ground for the “Harvard Boys”, who in search of success models used to quote Pakistan extensively. The text books of these two decades are full of Pakistani examples. According to World Bank estimates and international agencies’ reports only a few years back, it was predicted that Pakistan was ready to take off and mature to become a middle income country. The departure between the two types appeared in the approach and strategy adopted by the Far Eastern nations. In those societies the private entrepreneurs did not mature out of the evolutionary process, as on the pattern of the Western capitalism. In the Asian countries, private enterprise was enforced through government channels. In other words, the government itself, on voluntary basis, decided to lessen its power, so as to raise the economic standards of the country.

The main hurdle obstructing the economic, social and administrative development of Pakistan can be attributed to the lack of adequate political acumen and development of modern institutions. The leadership was either too weak to initiate a progressive program or it was occupied with such grave problems as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The absence of the continuity of political leadership was yet another reason for the lack of enthusiasm in the development of Pakistan. It must be mentioned here that from 1993 five prime ministers changed hands each one having his or her own manifesto.

In spite of the above mentioned factors, the future is far from gloomy. There is a long list of recent successes, both in foreign as well as domestic spheres. Pakistan recently hosted a summit of Economic Cooperation Conference (ECO), where important decisions on trade, and communication were taken by the member nations of Iran, Turkey, the Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan.

Pakistan has been instrumental in providing humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan, while maintaining strict neutrality in the internal affairs of that country. While the struggle went on in Kashmir, Pakistan continued to provide moral support to the victimized, in spite of enormous external pressures. Another feat is the opening of a new land route between Pakistan and the Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan. Transit through Afghanistan still poses serious hurdles, but with the inaugural trip successfully concluded, there are bright prospects that a regular service could operate in the future.

On the domestic front, Pakistan has been able to adhere to the 1973 constitution, despite of the martial law period of 1977-1988. General Zia could not abrogate the constitution but rather chose to set it aside. The bases provided by the current Constitution represent unanimity of national opinion as it was agreed by all the parties elected to the parliament in 1970 elections. The constitution provides a chance for the political institutions to strengthen and develop. At least, a foundation has been laid.

Pakistan is too important a country to be ignored in any future regional readjustments. In the changing circumstances, Pakistan has to play a significant role and reconstruct its relations with its traditional allies. Still further, it has to put its options in proper perspective.

Taliban: A House of Cards

29 November, 2001

By

Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat

A dramatic change in the Afghan situation let the regional countries grasping for explanations and even the coalition’s estimates of the Taliban military capacity seemed over-estimated – they just fell like a house of cards and vanished in thin air. Their retreat from their “strong holds”, was with an astonishing speed and the images of surrender from Konduz, along with their armor as well as the insensitive behavior in which they laid down their arms, tells it all. It is believed that there are more than 20,000 Taliban fighters and their supporters in the Pashtoon majority city in the North.

There might not be a similar instance where a fighting force submitted in a manner that it was armed to the teeth - with their tanks, jeeps and rocket launchers and least of all the smiling faces. To make it worse, the Taliban militia left behind their foreign supporters with criminal negligence, knowing well that there would be revenge and a blood bath by the rag-tag warlords of the Northern Alliance. Taliban deputy defence minister Mulla Fazal Akhund is quoted to have said on November 22nd that he had held negotiations with General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbuk commander, in Mazar-I-Sharif and that he would give himself up. Convincingly, he went on to say that “there will be peace and nothing will happen.” The irony is that those who operated under the name of Islam could not bring harmony and tranquility for the weaker sections of the society whom they ruled with an iron hand for more than five years, but were quick to surrender in front of a stronger force.

It is true and much advertised that when the Taliban emerged on the Afghan scene, there was a total chaos in the country and that the warlords were engaged in never ending activities of brutality, rape and other gross violations of human rights. It is also on record that the minority Tajiks usurped the power in Kabul and refused to accommodate other ethnic minorities, and even the majority Pashtuns were left out, in sharing the management of the territory. But, at the same instance, those who supported the Taliban militia expected a much more sane and balanced behaviour from the newly arrived. The Taliban leadership under semi educated Mullah Umar failed on all accounts. The militia fell short of understanding certain hard realities of statecraft. Their behavior as well towards the regional and the world community was beyond any logical explanations. After all Islamic history is full of the science of statecraft, diplomatic maneuvering and dealings with its adversaries. There was little understanding of the genuine Islamic norms and no attempt was made to learn from the religious scholars in other communities or for that matter from within their own immediate surroundings. General Kamal Matinuddin quotes Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami in his book “The Taliban Phenomenon”, to have expressed his disappointment in the credentials of the Taliban leadership. The Jamaat chief is reported to have remarked about the Madaris, from where the Taliban leadership received their basic learning that “education was not being properly taught as the teachers were uneducated maulvis.”

Similarly, no lesson was learnt from the welfare concept of an Islamic State and not a glimpse is evident from the Taliban to base their society on the socio-economic justice. On the contrary, all actions of the Taliban went in the opposite direction. Even those agencies of the United Nations and World Community that made efforts to help the vulnerable and impoverished Afghan population were pushed away with unexplainable vengeance. Osama bin Laden, an honoured guest of the Taliban was a multi-billionaire, but did not spend any of his wealth to lessen the miseries of the Afghan poor.

Instead, the Taliban rulers busied themselves in trivial acts, hitting hard at the private lives and habits of those who were forced to live under their thumb. A glaring example is that of several decrees that the Taliban passed when they took over in Kabul in 1996. To quote just a few - in December of the same year, the people of Afghanistan were forbidden to do the following: (1) To prevent keeping pigeons and playing with birds: Within ten days this habit/hobby should stop. After ten days this should be monitored and the pigeons and other playing birds should be killed. (2) To prevent kite-flying: The kite shops in the city should be abolished. (3) To prevent the British and American hairstyle: People with long hair should be arrested and taken to the Religious Police department to shave their hair. The criminal has to pay the barber. (4) To prevent beard shaving and its cutting: After one and a half months if anyone observed who has shaved and/or cut his beard, they should be arrested and imprisoned until their beard gets bushy (One wonders from where the “cutting” part comes from; maybe it’s the Sikh religion that influenced the Taliban). Still further, under the Taliban, the women were not permitted to work but were readily allowed to beg on the streets of Kabul.

Foreign volunteers from various nationalities came to Afghanistan, convinced by the Taliban leadership that their hosts are fighting a jihad against the evil forces. In the case of the Pakistanis, the leaders of “Talibinized” religious gangs are as guilty as the Taliban militia. These semi educated elements who have no knowledge of the spirit of Islam are directly responsible for the slaughter of thousands of youth – in many cases their parents were not even aware of the real intensions of those who taught them at the madrassas. The principal violator in this tragedy has been the Amir of Tehrik-I-Nifaz-Shariat (TNSM), Maulana Sufi Muhammad who is instrumental in leaving behind (all in the name of fighting a Jihad against the United States) more than eight thousand young people in Afghanistan, while he returned to Pakistan, gasping for his life. He was arrested and jailed for three years by the Pakistani authorities. What is required is a murder charge against the Maulana as according to one report hundreds of those abandoned were killed in Mazar-I-Sharif, while unknown large number of innocent youth is trapped in the besieged Kunduz. Already the TNSM has admitted that more than three thousand of their “brain-washed” young boys are missing and they have no information whether they are dead or imprisoned. The so called Jihadi group is now pleading the “infidel” Northern Alliance to release those who were left behind on the war fronts in Afghanistan. A 13-member delegation is in the process of visiting Afghanistan to impress upon the Northern Alliance their “gravest gaffe”. Interestingly, the appeal is not being made in the name of Islam but on reciprocal nationalist considerations. Haji Roohullah, a representative of the TNSM is reported to have said that his delegation would impress upon the Afghan conquering leaders that they should consider that Pakistan has been a “place of refugee for over two decades”. He further said, “We will impress upon the leaders to show the same magnanimity and large-heartedness.” One just wonders that where has the big talk of Jihad gone and still further whether the Pakistani military regime would take firm measures against those who are responsible for the useless murders of the Pakistani youth. These reckless acts not only are responsible for the loss of precious lives but it also brought a bad name to the country – a damage that would take a horrendous task and decades of hard work to be erased.

Their supporters in Pakistan are as much ignorant as their benefactors. Most of the students in these Madrassas are from the poorest of the poor communities and their main attraction is to get free food and clothing from these institutions. There are some who are attracted towards these self styled religious groups as they provide them with much needed identity, which they otherwise cannot achieve in a corrupt and callous socio-economic setup of Pakistan. Thus, left in lurch by the society, they become an easy prey to the whimsical desires of the Maulvies. The respective governments in Pakistan should have had enough character and courage to accept at least some responsibility for the ubiquitous massacre of the Pakistani youth and the tragedy of Afghanistan bungle, on at least four accounts.


One, the establishment in Islamabad failed to provide basic facilities for the less privileged families and as a consequence they were lured in by the vested interests. While the ruling elite lives pompous lives for themselves and their kin, mostly through plundering the assets of the country.


Secondly, they turned their faces on the other side when the so-called Jihadi groups started to send their recruits to take part in the Afghan civil war. The Islamabad establishment cannot exonerate itself by saying that the Pakistanis crossed the border without proper documents or permission. If they did so, that by itself is a failure of the authorities to perform their assigned duties.


Thirdly, no other than the Pakistani establishment knew that a gross violation of human rights in Afghanistan existed and no attempt was made to discourage that. An explanation that Afghanistan is a sovereign country and thereby we would not interfere would not stand, as the world knows that Pakistan could, if it wanted to, exercise sufficient leverage on the Kabul rulers. A regular parade of the Taliban officials in the five long years, to Islamabad and vise versa would negate all the excuses.


Fourthly, Pakistan continued its diplomatic links with the Taliban regime, even after the fall of Kabul, falsifying its previous stance that it recognizes governments that control the Afghan capital. It was at the American scolding that the Embassy in Islamabad was closed.

In these circumstances it was but natural that Pakistan became a villain in the Afghanistan episode, not only in the perception of the Afghan people but also for the International Community.

A JOURNEY THROUGH RURAL IRAN

November 08, 1991

By
Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat

A visit to the rural areas and small towns of northern and north western Iran is an exercise different from that of visiting big cities. The reports that appear in the western media and then picked up by the press of countries like Pakistan do not portrait the true state of development of the Iranian society. The assessments made in the foreign media judging Iran and its post war activities domestic as well as external, propagates a false impressions of a society which is on a bold advance with full vigour and strength to make up for the wasted years, both during the former Shah's reign and the eight years old imposed war by President Saddem Hussein. What is transmitted to the world is based on misinformation either consciously adopted or because of the lack of proper knowledge.

Yet another misconception originates from sporadic investigations carried on during a few days of a stay in a metropolitan city like Tehran. Expanding cities have their own peculiar characterises and does not always in a general term reflect on a national character.

Iran's twenty four provinces are demarcated on the basis of administrative convenience, therefore ethnic or linguist considerations become secondary in comprehending the country’s provincial profile. Nevertheless, the Kurdistan province of Iran has a concentration of Kurdish minority while the North Western province of Azerbijan inhabits the majority of Azeris a minority which speaks the Turkish language and belongs to the Iranians of the Azerbaijan stock.

A journey through the tract of Kirman Shah or renamed Bakhtaran province after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, with Bakhtaran, a beaming city with economic and social activity as its capital provides a unique experience both in terms of awareness about the Iranian society and the developmental schemes that are being enforced by the government for the uplift of the Iranian nation as a part of a full scale programme in the post war "decade of development".

The province comprises numerous small villages and towns, situated in the vast green valleys surrounded by high but barren mountains. It was in these harsh rocky mountains that legendary Farhad laboriously tried to dig a canal whose signs are visible even today – for his beloved.

The Kurd population of Bakhtaran province has been largely adjusted in the mainstream of the Farsi speaking community of Iran. Only those that live in the remote mountains or are nomads still maintain their separate identity and prefer to learn and speak only the Kurdish language. The necessity of looking for a livelihood in other regions of Iran have compelled most of the young Kurds to adopt the language and even the dress of the majority so as to easily adjust with the general population of the country. Many Iranians claim that Kurds are from the Iranian stock of race, and are therefore much closer to the Iranians in cultural terms than they are to any other race or ethnic community such as the Turks and the Arabs.

The lopsided economic development of the Shah era has been minimised and the prevalent practice is to plan with special considerations for the centuries old downtrodden communities residing in the remote areas far away from the capital. One should recognise that the real mettle of the Islamic revolution are the poor as well as the low middle class masses of Iran.

Throughout one’s journey in the rural Iran one detects a marked improvement in the agricultural districts along with the establishment of the supportive water resources. It is carried on the model of huge projects to constructs dams and other irrigational facilities for the farmers. The strongest component of the Iran society giving it an edge over the Persian Gulf region in its agricultural potential. That exactly is the field of development on which the revolutionary regime is concentrating the foremost. Iran remains the only country in the Persian Gulf region which has a great potential in agriculture not only for the domestic consumption but also for export.

The ignored rural Iran has in the post revolutionary era been granted an equal or even more share of the developmental piece regardless of its ethnic or geographical location. The impressions created by some critics that certain areas of Tehran are not receiving the attention that they used to during the Shah's time is true because the rich urban Iranian localities now have to share an equal ordeal with that of rural Iran. Rural Iran is getting its due recognition not only in agricultural sector but also petroleum as well as non petroleum industry is at the verge of a takeoff stage. The health /educational quarters are being given full attention wherever required.

The reconstruction work in the province of Bikhtaryan as well as Gilan and Mazdaran provinces (situated along the coast of the Caspian Sea in the North Central Iran ) captivates the attention of any visitor. The basis emphasis of the government has been on the reconstruction of either damaged projects or those that had been left incomplete because of the imposed war. These projects mostly fulfil prerequisite of a particular geographical area. For example the oil refinery near the city of Mazadaran that had been hit hard and repeatedly by the Iraqis has been restored to its full capacity. The gas extracted from the oil, burning over the top of the long chimney bears testimony to the fact stated. Other industrial projects are either under way or are planned for the near future.

The real strength of the Kurdish majority province Bakhtaran remains in the development of agriculture. There is abundance of water under the useable land in the area, there is machinery and know how and above all a will to develop the potentials of the land of this region. The shah's regime depended largely on the imports of the agriculture produce and its dependents and even such items like butter, milk and meat were imported from Holland, U.S., Australia, etc. for the privileged few. The sole dependency on oil and its products by the former regime lost the advantage that Iran always possessed in the region.

The northern provinces around the Caspian Sea, because of its rich land, are fairly advance in the agriculture sector. These provinces grow rice of a superior quality, grow a high quality tea as well as olives of notable worth. One can witness artificial forests being successfully grown on the otherwise barren mountains. It should be pointed out here that the Iranian mountains range constitutes of solid rock with very little mud formation which makes it difficult for the growth of easy vegetation.

The credit of the developmental projects in rural Iran goes especially to "Sazman i Jihad" (Jihad Organization), whose job is to start developmental projects where other sectors are hesitant to venture, either because of the difficult terrain or hardships confronted in terms of the nature of the task. This organization is directly under the control of the President.

The socio political structure of the rural Iranian society is the support base for the Islamic Iranian values as advocated by the Islamic Revolution. The rural population has been a supportive drive for the revolution thus making it possible for the system to secure roots in the country. After the war, the restrictions that accompany any emergency situation have been removed and the structures as well as code of laws are being adjusted as according to the requirements of the circumstances. The strong base of the Islamic Iranian culture is the masses of the rural Iran as well as the poorer sections of the big cities. A casual remark of the economically well off sections of the Iranian big cities is not a criteria to make a judgement.

The impression that one gets while visiting the small towns and villages of the Bakhtaran, Hamadan, Gilan and Mazadaran provinces is that the post war (1980 1988) Iranian society has more stability but also an equilibrium which the country badly needs in the complex and difficult regional as well as international political/military situation that it is placed. The Iranian people of the rural areas are much more confident of their abilities to move their societies towards economic and social development while keeping a secure proximity with its very strong Islamic Iranian cultural heritage.

The rural Iran, whether in the comparatively backward areas of the North west or elsewhere is now geared for the bold and enterprising policies for development and progress.

Sunday, December 31, 2006

AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"

FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN

November 6, 2006

Reviewer: Syed Farooq Hasnat

In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.

In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.

In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.

General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control. "In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed. General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D. Columbia, Maryland