AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"

FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN

November 6, 2006

Reviewer: Syed Farooq Hasnat

In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.

In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.

In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.

General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control. "In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed. General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D. Columbia, Maryland

PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN MURKY WATERS

Tuesday, August 02, 2005

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

In June and July the American troops and the Afghan government functionaries came under a series of armed attacks, shattering the comparative calm in Afghanistan. These vicious and daring assaults indicate that the much awaited parliamentary elections in September will not be free from trouble, and that the menace of Taliban still exists, as a potential future challenge. Contrary to what was the forecast in the past, these assaults specify that the war against terrorism in Afghanistan is far from over. The latest resistance inflicted a number of causalities on the American troops, raising the total of dead to 150, since 2001. There are nearly 15,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with an additional battalion poised for that war torn country.

The heavy reliance on the American forces indicate the lack of organised Afghan security structure, i.e., even after more than four years of the elimination of the Taliban administration and the Afghan army remains far from adequately trained. President Hamid Karzai largely depends on the US commandos for his personnel security and his opponents taunt that he is just a Mayor of Kabul, as his authority does not extend beyond that city. Although Karzai is a Pashtun but his government is dominated by much detested and suspected Uzbeks and Tajiks, minorities. Afghanistan still remains ethnically subjected as well as a competitive society with blocks of authority in various ethnic regions of the country. The law and order in Afghanistan has always been far from satisfactory and the pace of development remains extremely slow. According to an opinion, “this remained an area where, unfortunately, the Karzai government and the International Security Assistance Force have failed to deliver, as security beyond Kabul is virtually non-existent.” In particular, the Zabul Province and the adjoining areas of Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces have become strong holds of the militants. It is estimated that in these areas, the Taliban are much organised with no shortage of men, weapons and finances. The situation in Afghanistan is described by some as, “one of barely managed chaos”.

Before the attacks, it was estimated by the US sources and the Afghan government that insurgency had faded away and that the Taliban had lost their clout in the country. The main reason given was that last October, Presidential elections took place without hindrance and that during the winter of 2004-5, there was little or no activity from the Taliban. However, since April of this year 45 US military personnel were killed by the suspected Taliban, while hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians died in armed clashes. It was said that the Afghan militants were using the same tactics of attack as the Iraqi insurgents. These activities panicked the fragile Afghan government, as well it exposed its vulnerability.

Accompanied by the hype in militancy, came a volley of direct and indirect blames on Pakistan. Included, in that rhetoric was the statement of Afghan-American US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad. He vehemently said that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were somewhere in Pakistan. He however, could not substantiate his allegations with details and evidence. His claim that the militants have infiltrated from Pakistan, in an organised manner, was termed as baseless and irresponsible by Pakistan. Ambassador Khalizad’s charge was followed by statements by the Afghan government officials, the official controlled news media and President Karzai, himself. In Pakistan the reaction was sharp and forthcoming. Apart from a strong statement from government representative, terming these charges as irresponsible and without evidence, the un-official electronic and print media started to question the rationale of Pakistan’s complete commitment towards war against terrorism, in this part of the world. One of the leading Pakistani daily remarked, “It’s time Pakistan should rethink its policy of cooperating in the War on Terror and being rewarded only with slurs”.

The present crisis was defused with the intervention of President Bush, who persuaded both the countries to focus more on war against terrorism, than finding faults with each other. These developments further confirmed that bilateral ties between the two neighboring countries have become a matter of triangular relations, aggravating with the spread of global terrorism – becoming more problematic. Pak-Afghan relations remain a matter of serious concern for the US strategic planners, as long as militancy continues to dominate the region.

Pakistan maintains around 80,000 troops in the tribal and adjoining areas, with Afghanistan. The borders are completely sealed, with latest reconnaissance devices and the Taliban entering Afghanistan in an organised manner is inconceivable. The main weakness lies with the Afghan security apparatus itself. A glaring example is the escape of four Afghan prisoners from Bagram jail, a facility that is heavily guarded and is under the direct control of the American troops. The escape was not possible without the cooperation of the Afghan soldiers, on duty. Till now there has been no trace of the escapees, who were known for their hardened ideology and considered extremely dangerous. It is easier for the Afghan administration to blame Pakistan for their security lapses, as little efforts are made by Kabul administration to establish its control in areas that are beyond the city of Kabul. Apart from that the Pashtun population is kept alienated by the Tajik-Uzbak alliance in the government. All Taliban might be Pashtuns but all Pashtuns does not confer to the ideology of the Taliban. In the close knit tribal society of Afghanistan, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two. Sometimes it is deliberately done so, to keep the majority of the Pashtuns, who are more than 50 percent of the Afghan population, away from the mainstream politics.

Since the 1980s, Afghanistan is coupled with Pakistan in a number of ways. The basis being that no matter what happens in Afghanistan it has direct fallout on the Pakistani society, whether as a result of regional compulsions or so chosen by the Pakistani establishment. The flurry of attacks on the Afghan government troops and the American military deployments during these months raised many new questions. These were not only in regard to Afghanistan’s internal security but also relates to the fragile relations between the two neighboring countries. At least, as a part of a policy pronouncement, Kabul recognises that its security is closely allied with that of Pakistan. On the eve of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s one day official visit to Kabul on July 24, these sentiments were reflected in Afghan Foreign Ministry statement saying that “friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were in the national interest of both countries and an essential component to promote stability in the region”. On several occasions, similar statements have also been made in the past. But, when pressures increases, the level of relations between the two countries come back to a naught.

The Afghan government continues to suspect Pakistan for being supportive of the militants in their country and in the present circumstances, there is little chance that Kabul could be convinced otherwise. The focal point of these relations remains around the conflict between Taliban and the Afghan security setup. Pakistan is dragged in the Afghan quandary, when it fails to manage the operations of Afghan related militant groups in its own society. Therefore, when it comes to Afghan militancy, the part of the problem comes from within Pakistan. Musharraf’s government is seen by many as ineffective. The General’s July 21 address to the nation vowed to eradicate militancy in Pakistan, but is regarded by observers as nothing more than his January 12, 2002 declaration to take charge of extremism and militancy in the country. The present “awakening” of Musharraf is attributed to July 7 London bombings, in which the suicide bombers were alleged to have visited a Pakistani madrassa.

On its part, the Afghan society always presents itself in a package, carrying with itself a variety of dynamics and variables, which most of the time is difficult to manage by normal means. The past experience shows that the Afghans have yet to learn, solving their conflicts and accommodating the other point of view while running the government affairs. They have no experience in the modern concepts of legislative bodies, political parties or a structured judicial system. Whatever little they have, is confined to Kabul. In sum, there does not exist a political culture on whose foundations a modern society could be constructed. More so, with the brain drain since 1979, that went on unabated, the Afghan society lacks an indigenous expertise to manage their country. Experience has proved that a divided Afghanistan, devoid of any functional institutions, is incapable of reaching any political solution. As a reaction, the Kabul administration starts looking for a scapegoat and Pakistan is invariably there to be singled out.

There is little hope that the forthcoming September parliamentary elections would provide a substantial betterment of the overall situation. Pakistan would continue to receive the fallout of the Afghan mismanagement, unless the government takes immediate strict measures to eradicate the Afghan linked militants. The noted aspect is that Pakistan has lost its creditability to perform any meaningful role in the divided and volatile Afghan society. Because of intense past interference in the Afghan factional conflict, Pakistan has conceded most of its neutral ground and is branded as an active partner in the existing militancy. In fact the Pakistani establishment is visualised as a major part of the problem. This view is also shared by some American officials, who regard Musharraf not doing enough to stop the recruitment of the Taliban cadres. After all, Ambassador Khalizad is nothing more than a mouthpiece of the Bush administration.

In the circumstances, it is required that Pakistan makes drastic adjustments in its Afghan related attitudes and put its own house in order. That would provide an opportunity to depart from its defective perceptions of the past and set the record straight. Pakistan has got another chance to amend its follies. It still has an opportunity to exit from the “Afghan muddle” that it had partly created for itself.

A New Meaning of Conflicts: Some Lessons for Pakistan

Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat
Adjunct Scholar
Middle East Institute
Washington, D.C


Increasingly, the perceptions and rules governing post Second World War conflicts, border wars and even total wars have changed. In various situations the era of standing armies and the might of armament have become less relevant. The theorists and futurists of conflict can no longer rely on a raw data of the armed forces as well the destructive capacity of an armament. There are many more factors that must be scrutinized before we can come to an objective prediction. The tactics have changed and so has the focus of a war theater. Urban guerilla combat, hit and run, suicide bombing and more so the battles being fought in front of cameras, with night vision technology are the hard realities that is and will be considered in the future. Furthermore, it has been observed that low intensity conflicts take a heavy toll on the developed economies. Apart from the tactics, the ideological nature of global conflicts, particularly in the Middle East has received a new meaning. The Muslims see the support for westernization of their societies as a reminder of the European colonial onslaught through their “civilizing mission”. They perceive the agenda of “Enlightened Moderation” nothing but a foreign instrument of dominance, especially when the political institutions are made exception to this rule. The West, in turn sees the Muslim agitation as a threat to their “civilization” and “way of living”, as repeatedly presented by the Western politicians and media. In short, the rules of the game have changed.

The United States in Vietnam and again in Iraq, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Israel in Lebanon wrestled against much smaller and weak opponents but were unable to pacify their adversaries. This was in spite of the fact that there was no match between the belligerents, in terms of military equipment and usage of defence technology. In such endeavors these otherwise powerful nations also loose their credibility of being invincible. Who could image that Israel would be subdued, when in the past they were able to rout the combined armies of the Arab countries, in just six days. Surely, these setbacks have reduced the capacity of global and regional powers to take or influence any similar endeavors, in the future. The United Sates found itself completely incapacitated in the Lebanon crises and the lingering Palestinian issue, mainly because of its being bogged down in Iraq. In all these situations it is the stronger power that suffered ultimate defeat in a sense that it failed to achieve its goals for which aggression was launched. On the other hand, though weak entities suffered tremendous human loss and misery, but it is the ultimate that counts.

In three out of the four mentioned conflicts the tactics of widespread suicide bombing was and is being used only in Iraq. There is some exception in another war theater in Afghanistan where the conflict still goes on and therefore a final assessment has still to come. The suicide tactics, though deplorable is erroneously being seen by the West as a part of a Muslim ideology and religion. The reality is that basically suicide bombings are a European invention by an anarchist, Joseph Conrad, who introduced it in his novel “Secret Agent” (1907). The concept was used as a battle tactic, by Japanese Kamikaze, during the Second World War and there were some instances from the Germans, as well. Later on, the Tamil Tigers used this method against the government of Sri Lanka. As we understand today, it is primarily a tool of stateless groups, who are otherwise out numbered and outgunned by their adversaries.

The United States under President Bush sees global conflicts in a changed perspective. Well know Bush doctrine points out towards a notion of a “preemptive strike”, meaning that a country can be attacked and even destroyed, if there is a suspicion that in the future it can pose a threat to the American interests. Using the pretext of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction Iraq was attacked in March-April, 2003. Even when it came to be known that there were no weapons of such kind, nor Saddam had any links with al-Qaeda, the justification to continue the conflict got another names like “regime change” and “establishing a democratic system”. The conventional wisdom as established by the U.N. charter is that a country cannot resort to war unless attacked, in actual terms and its national sovereignty threatened.

In another war theater, the Israelis knew no limits when under the pretext of freeing two of its solders devastated Lebanon and killed more than 500 children and an equal number of innocent women. Both these conflicts took a heavy toll on human lives, as thousands were displaced and their homes destroyed. It is estimated that in Iraq more than half a million Iraqi civilians have lost their lives with many more injured, while in Lebanon more than 1000 died in just 30 days of relentless aerial bombing. In spite of all the killings and destruction, both the United States and Israel remained far from victory. The stubbornness and reliance of the small groups send a message that future conflicts and wars will be of different nature – where huge armies, armament and advanced military technology will take a back seat.

MIT professor Noam Chomsky and co-author Professor Gilbert Achcar points towards the new implications of inter-state conflicts in their recent book, “Perilous Power:” The authors observe that first; religion is being used in the recent conflicts, as a vehicle for political and economic interests. Secondly, fundamentalism is not confined to the Muslim combatant groups, alone. It is also very much “a powerful Christian strain as it exists in the US that has enormous influence over right wing Republican-led governments.” The authors acknowledge that fundamentalism has become a global affair, spread over nearly all societies around the globe – a phenomenon that came into focus just over the last two decades. This view is supplemented by Reza Aslan in his book “There is no god but God”. He cites one of many examples where the global conflicts are seen by the fundamentalists, in the West, as between good and evil. He writes, “When the Republican senator from Oklahoma, James Inhofe, stands before the U.S. Congress and insists that the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are not political or territorial battles but ‘a contest over whether or not the word of God is true,’ he speaks, knowingly or not, the language of the Crusades.”

The changed perspective of conflicts requires that nations like Pakistan with huge defence budget and top-heavy army should reconsider their security options. As the examples of Iraq and Lebanon shows the new wars can be fought successfully, without the shining insignias of the elite class. Genuine requisites to protect a nation include the strength of people through their well build civil institutions as well as the requirement of the involvement by the people in the decision making process.

The mystery of Pak-Iran ties

Monday, December 4, 2006

By Dr Syed Farooq Hasnat

While talking to the Iranian media delegation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said on November 6, that his country supports Iran to acquire nuclear technology and that Pakistan desires to develop its relations with Iran, still further. The Prime Minister elaborated that Pakistan was serious in the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project as it would strengthen trade between the two countries. Repeating the rhetoric in the same tone Foreign Minister Kasuri assured the Iranian delegation that Pakistan opposes the American use of force against the Iranian nuclear sites. On another occasion Mr Aziz said, “we think Iran should not proliferate. We’re against production of any nuclear weapons in the region. We think Iran does have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards and guidelines.”

It goes without saying that neither the PM nor his Foreign Minister design Pakistan’s domestic or foreign policy. The fixation of the establishment with a single power has paralysed the policy makers to consider the future developments that would emerge after the international war against terrorism concludes or subsides. There is no blueprint for days when Pakistan will struggle for partners and reliance, as prevalent high dependency policy, projected and perused zealously, would whither away, as it would not find any partners. When it comes to Pakistan-Iran relations there is much more than what actually is being said by the establishment or its proxies. It is this aspect which worries a common Pakistani who would like to see Pakistan as a sovereign and viable state, free to choose its friends and allies in a long term perspective. It is being felt that a traditional high priority that every government attached to its relations with Iran is no more there. The closeness of the two countries is reflected well by President Ayub Khan, who said while addressing the Iranian Senate in 1959 that, “Our two nations are no strangers to each other, our friendship is nothing new… Your classics are our classics. Your heroes are our heroes. It is not only through a common culture and religious heritage that our nations are linked together—historically we have been one nation in the past, geographically we have a common border and ethnologically we are of the same stock.”

The point of departure from what was said in the late 1950s comes when the present establishment does not posses enough sensitivity and sophistication to understand the realities of closeness between the two countries. The lowest ebb of relations between the two countries came when in mid-1990s the Pakistani establishment developed close ties with the Taliban and openly supported them in their battles against the Iran backed Northern Alliance. The darkest moment came when nine Iranian diplomats were killed by the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998. Iranians accused Pakistan of not doing enough to stop the murder of their diplomats, although assurances ware given by the Pakistani government for the safety of the diplomats. A crises situation arose in the region when 200,000 Iranian troops massed on the Afghan border supported by amour, helicopters and other war related logistics were put in place. Although an armed clash was avoided, it left yet another blotch on the weakling Pakistan-Iran relations.

Before the Taliban became Pakistan’s obsession and consequentially an icon of the flawed policy, Pakistan maintained more than cordial relations with Iran. As mentioned above, Iran was regarded as closest to Pakistan’s history, culture, language, and heritage and security interests, along with Turkey. People of Pakistan still recall the 14 September 1965 visit of the Iranian Prime Minister to Rawalpindi, along with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He carried a message of support from the Iranian government, for Pakistan’s conflict with India.Iran co-ordinated its policies with Pakistan, opposing the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a visible tilt towards Iran in its war against Iraq. Both the countries are partners in an economic regional organisation, Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), a forerunner of Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), which was established in 1964 along with Turkey. Within the regional organisational framework both countries vow to continue to co-operate with each other on various matters of mutual interest, but there is hardly a substantial dividend on the ground. Both the countries have signed scores of MoUs and agreements but very little have come out in a concrete manner. Even the well-projected and well-advertised gas pipeline is under jeopardy. The trade volume between the two neighbouring countries remains disappointingly low and no serious parameters are set to correct this deficiency.

Despite of difference of policies between Pakistan and Iran on the Taliban issue, after 2002 both the countries struggled to maintain good workable relations. There are stronger extractions that do not allow these countries to harmonise with each other. There is hardly a high level contact between the two countries or a strong desire to improvise methods for closer ties. General Musharraf has not visited Iran since 1999 and so has any Iranian high official after President Mohammad Khatami’s visit in December 2002. There seems to be a detracting pull that is tearing both the countries apart from each other. A number of analysts are of the view that there is a powerful lobby in Islamabad which has succeeded in keeping Pakistan away from Iran and they believe that it is the same lobby which is creating hindrances in the gas pipeline and other co-operative measures between the two neighbours.

It is a wrong assumption to believe that Iran’s closer ties with India is a factor in distancing of relations between Iran and Pakistan. First, Pakistan itself for obvious reasons is going out of its way to normalise relations with India, even making adjustments in its principled position. Secondly, Indian stance in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran’s nuclear programme has further proved that this premise is not correct. There are other reasons that become a hindrance between the two countries to normalise their relations.

The confined people of Pakistan are mere spectators in this big puzzle. The clueless masses just ponder that who allowed these precious links to wither away and what kind of self-interests are responsible for inflicting this damage to the Pakistani vital objectives and above all who has taken away all the warmth for the Iranian people.

email: hasnatf1@yahoo.com

Changed scenario of Kashmir conflict

By S. Farooq Hasnat


Issue 03 Volume 05, July 07 - 13, 2005

In the past, the policymakers mishandled the Kashmir issue, today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course of action for freedom

For more than one-and-a-half years, General Musharraf has been bending backwards to accommodate the Indian leaders. His declared intention is to resolve the Kashmir dispute, during his tenure in office. On one occasion he said that the dispute could be resolved in two weeks. To engage the Indian leadership, he took a number of steps including his New Delhi and Agra visits and withdrawal of ban on Kashmiris travel across the Line of Control. Along with that, meetings between the officials of the two countries were initiated to look into Siachen Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Baglihar dam and other disputes.

The critics of Musharraf's policy of reconciliation with India argue that although he offered many concessions, one after another, he got little in return. They further said that in real terms, a tacit understanding with India has been undertaken that the Line of Control (LoC) will be converted into an international border between the two countries. The General refutes these allegations and says that his proposals do not negate the principled stance of Pakistan. As a result of these developments, the tensions between the two countries eased out, but so far no substantial progress has been made, either on 'minor' issues or on Kashmir itself. However, the single most significant headway was the two-week long visit of the nine Kashmiri leaders, of which five were from the 'moderate' wing of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The snag of the visit was the absence of Syed Ali Geelani, leader of his own faction of the Hurriyat. He declined the Pakistani invitation by saying that he had decided to show his 'resentment' of what he called Pakistan government's 'deviation from its stand on Kashmir'. He further said that India has not shifted from its standpoint on Kashmir and he was not sure what he will bring back from the Pakistan visit. It was felt in Pakistan that Geelani's decision had dampened the initiative to start a dialogue with the Kashmiri leaders in held Kashmir. After all, Syed Ali Geelani was the one who once called himself 'a proud Pakistani'. Another key Kashmiri, Shabbir Shah wrote, 'Kashmiri' in the Indian passport application's citizenship column, and was refused the passport.

The Hurriyat leaders' visit to Pakistan changed the whole scenario of the Kashmir dispute, when they clearly made home their point that any future solution to the Kashmir issue must be initiated by the Kashmiris, themselves. They further said that they would not accept, as has been a practice in the past, that Kashmir is labelled as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India.Hurriyat's key spokesman and held Kashmir's spiritual leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq even denied the relevance of the 1948 resolutions, of the United Nations Security Council. These utterances made irrelevant the long drawn position of Pakistan, for which it worked hard for five decades. Mirwaiz, on his return to Srinagar, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times, saying that it will not be acceptable to split Kashmir on the basis of 'religion, ethnic or regional divisions'. He further wrote that his group intends to continue a dialogue with Pakistan as well as the Indian leadership, on separate tracks. According to him, "This will give Kashmiris a sense of genuine involvement, a must for any progress towards resolution". Mirwaiz made it clear that attempts to converge the LoC into a permanent international boundary would be a reprehensible action. These remarks by the Kashmiri leaders sent ripples across the relevant circles in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. There is no doubt that one main fallout of the Hurriyat visit is that the initiative has been taken away from Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves have taken the driving seat. While addressing thousands of Kashmiris, at a mosque in Srinagar, after his return from landmark 14 days visit to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, Mirwaiz declared that General Musharraf told him "Any solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir will be acceptable to Pakistan". This is not what the Pakistani military leadership had expected. After all it marginalised Pakistan's position and the circumstances are moving fast towards the conception of an independent Kashmir. Another aspect to be considered is that whether the gestures by the Indian government are to defuse as well confuse the issue or are serious attempts to resolve the dispute according to the desires of the Kashmiri people. Representing this viewpoint, a noted Lahore daily wrote in its editorial of June 22, that "The whole idea behind the façade of Indian sincerity in resolving disputes one hears so much about, is to achieve normalisation with Pakistan, extract the maximum concessions from it in the economic and commercial spheres and stabilise peaceful conditions in the Subcontinent. It seems under the impression that it has found the present government in Islamabad a willing partner."Many in Pakistan feel that the establishment fall prey to its own manoeuvring, where before the visit, little or no homework was done. It is also believed that confused, unclear and foreign formulas were destined to meet this fate. To a certain extent, the grievances of the Kashmiri leaders are justified.

The Kashmir dispute was dealt by both the warring neighbours as purely a territorial dispute. Whenever, and at whatever level the matter was discussed, the role of the Kashmiri people was ignored. It had become purely an issue within the larger range of Pakistan-India bilateral relations. More than 80,000 Kashmiris have lost their lives and countless women have been raped since the 1989 home grown revolt against the 700,000-strong Indian forces, but these gross human rights violations remained part of the bilateral dispute.When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, jihadis stepped up their activities in Kashmir. But it blemished the legitimate Kashmiri struggle. At the same time, as a result of jihadi fallout, the Pakistani society suffered tremendously, in the shape of rising militancy and violence. Steve Coll, a critic of Pakistan policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir writes: "Infrastructure needed to produce jihadists proved corrosive for Pakistani society, a development not appreciated at that time by those who developed the strategy. As it turned out, a heavy price was paid for the reliance on groups whose members were deeply committed to fundamentalism. Often these groups began to penetrate Pakistani society." The settlement of the Kashmir dispute will always be difficult, as stakes are very high for India, for Pakistan and for the freedom-fighters. It has to be accepted that the lingering Kashmir dispute is highly complex as well as emotionally charged, for all the concerned parties. Moreover, the post-9/11 world, where the Americans are enforcing their agenda, makes even a genuine Kashmiri armed struggle for freedom more difficult. It is in this context that an assessment as well as solution to the Kashmir dispute is to be made. There are certain compulsions that must be mentioned under which Pakistan has to operate. Pakistan supporting the freedom-fighters' armed struggle, either tacitly or otherwise, would not be acceptable under the norms of the new international value system.

The era of jihadi groups is over. Nowhere in the future would the world community accept these groups as a valid means of struggle for the right of self-determination. In the past, the Pakistani policymakers mishandled the Kashmir issue and today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course of action for freedom, where even the meaning of freedom has to be rewritten.

RESCUING PAKISTAN

WEEKLY INDEPENDENT
October 04, 2001

Taliban and their Pakistani supporters have very little comprehension of the recent developments around them and have no clue regarding the security hazards to Pakistan_________________________

by Dr. S Farooq Hasnat

If one examines the recent statements of Pakistan government functionaries, an impression is given that instead of adopting a clear-cut policy towards Afghanistan, there exists a lack of conviction as well as confidence in Islamabad.

A segment of the population read it as a signal of sympathy for the Talibans while others interpret it as an outright support for the American position against International Terrorism. Another part of the population is of the view that the government in Islamabad accepted the American conditions under duress. There are still others who firmly believe that the decision makers are playing "hard to get" with the Americans.

The reality is that the government wants to keep all parties guessing and satisfied at the same time. There is one danger which goes together with this policy -- that with the arrival of the ultimate, it would annoy all actors in the Afghan riddle and would destabilize the society still further. As a consequence, the people of Pakistan are confused and the apprehensions are regarding the wrong messages being sent to the wrong people. It would become still serious if the international community's perception is not corrected in a positive direction, notwithstanding that on a number of occasions assurances are being made to the international anti-terrorist collision that every effort will be made to go along with the new fight against terror.

From September 11th onwards at least two high-powered delegations visited Kandhar virtually begging Mullah Umar to listen to reason and take appropriate steps to defuse the situation. The latest delegation of September 29th was assigned to convince the Talibans to comprehend the requirements of the changing global realities. The demand also included releasing the arrested aid workers. Although the official circles denied, the delegations had the blessings of the Islamabad establishment and were accompanied by high-ranking military officials including the Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Lt. General Mehmood. No other than Mullah Umar's teacher formed a part of the good-will delegation from Pakistan.

On their return, one of the companions of the ten-member delegation said, "we did not discuss Osama. He was not on our agenda". While the Afghan Council in Karachi explained: "It is not possible that clerics of such a caliber would make such irresponsible demands, because without evidence, the Americans would never give up a person. So why should we be expected to do that?" Even a list presented of 40 Pakistani terrorists that had taken refuge in the Afghan territory was not entertained.

The recent expressions clearly demonstrate that little progress was made, from Pakistan's perception, in solving the crisis. The enigma is that the similar ideological views pushed the Talibanised Pakistani Ulemas to be more inclined towards Afghanistan. Not long ago, one such leader said on record if a choice is to be made between the two countries, he would choose Afghanistan. Reacting to the second delegation's return, the Foreign Office spokesperson sheepishly admitted: "Both Afghan leadership and Ulema have reaffirmed their commitment to security, safety and integrity of the two neighbouring nations. Both the parties agreed to be in contact with each other and that another meeting might take over as and when necessary". Such casual remarks in the fast moving events, which threaten Pakistan's security, speak volumes for themselves. The official announcement reflects lack of clarity and proper management crisis riddle of the country's policy.

Furthermore, it seems clear that the Talibans and their Pakistani supporters have very little comprehension of the recent developments around them and have no clue regarding the security hazards to Pakistan or alternatively they are getting wrong signals from the Islamabad power circles. It is said by Mullah Umar's critics that the Kabul militia is completely ignorant about the complications of the regional as well as global system and that they operate purely on pre-Islamic tribal traditions. Depriving the girls to attend schools, closing down the television station, prohibiting the women to consult male doctors, even if the disease relates to a complicated brain surgery are just few examples to support the arguments. A glaring contradiction is that if the girls are not educated, then how can lady doctors be produced in the first place. The Tabibans have no answers to these logical questions.

As the Pakistani government was beating around the bush, it was reported that the American and the British commandos were already operating in Afghanistan, a news that was neither denied nor confirmed by the US officials - an indication that the Pakistani efforts to engage the Talibans are of little consequence for the American policy strategists. In parallel but contradictory developments, Pakistan was quick to ban Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Kashmir related organization and froze the accounts of the Al Rashid Trust, as desired by the US State Department and the United Nations Security Council's unanimous resolution of September 29th. The resolution said in part: "Freeze without delay" the resources of terrorists and terror organizations". It also put restrictions by demanding from the member countries to "deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, or provide save havens".

In short, even at this critical hour, the Pakistani establishment does not have a coordinated Afghan policy, nor is there any desire of having one. In fact it never had a long-term strategy on the Afghan situation ever since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Time and again it was being advocated that external interference in Afghanistan has always met with failures. But those who said the loudest themselves violated this basic principle.Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto's second tenure never hesitated to interfere in the Afghan affairs, a tradition that was carried on by the successive governments. These regimes nourished and encouraged the Talibans in their civil war against the Northern Alliance, caring little for the growing civil rights violations and ignoring the vital interests of Pakistan. Even today, a mind set is visible in the Foreign Office and amongst the various sections of the ruling elite, that Pakistan must obstruct any settlement, which would dislodge the Talibans from Kabul. They regard it as a perfect model for preserving Pakistan's security interests. However, the reality is far from what the Pakistani elite perceives. As a direct result of interfering in the Afghan affairs, the Pakistan society had to confront at least two evils - first in the form of branding ourselves with the terrorists and the second related to the ideological decay in our society. The first is reflected in the worldwide suspicion of Pakistan's involvement in international terrorism - thus isolating Pakistan, both in the regional as well as in its international environments.

Most dangerous of all the Pakistani status as a responsible nuclear power has come under strict scrutiny. Even in the hour of dire security risk, no regional country is prepared to establish close diplomatic coordination with Pakistan and the government is finding it extremely difficult to invite itself even to the friendliest of the friendly Muslim community of nations. Pakistan's contacts have not exceeded beyond telephonic conversations. On the contrary, the rest of Afghanistan neighbours have established Afghan related contacts with the regional nations. To illustrate, Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi visited Lebanon, Syria and above all Egypt with whom it does not enjoy cordial relations and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members stepped up their coordinating efforts as well and same goes for the Central Asian Republics.

The other adverse fall out of interference in the Afghan affairs distorted the traditional Pakistani society, hitting at its ideological roots, notwithstanding the gun and drug culture. The Pakistani society was constructed on the premises of love and peace. The Sufis and poets like Shah Abdul Latif Bhatai, Khwaja Ghulam Farid, Waris Shah, Khushal Khan Khattak, Bullay Shah and many others preached message of love, kindness, compassion and tolerance. Under the influence of these saints, the Pakistani society knew no other norms but of Islamic tenderness - until a few decades back the Talibanisation started to take its roots in the pure land. While the successive governments looked the other way, the pre-Islamic creed of religious cults and gangs introduced hate, murder and bigotry in the minds of the Pakistani youth. Murder and attacks on the mosques of those who resisted this alien creed became a common occurrence. Taking advantage of rampant poverty and unemployment, the youth were taken from their mothers' laps, brain washed and dispatched un-prepared to the war-zones, where either they disappeared or their dead bodies arrived home. All this was done in the name of jihad and Islam. The Talibans had declared their civil war with the fellow Muslim Northern Alliance as a holy war by issuing a Fatwa in this regard.

Inculcated by the Talibanised Mullas of Pakistan, this poison of hate devastated families all around Pakistan. The love and compassion gave way to the new language of extremism and terrorism. The language of firearms became a fashion of the time and the Pakistani society gradually lost its honor, dignity, sanity and above all its balance. Our society finally succumbed to the alien culture and habits. Different networks established by the Talibanised Pakistanis have close contacts with the Talibans and probably with Osama bin Laden as well. In order to regain its honour and to get rid of the culture of hate and bigotry, the honorable solution for Pakistan would be to keep away from the internal affairs of Afghanistan. We must adopt a rigid "hands off policy" on Afghanistan. Already we are being accused of colonial tendencies towards our Western neighbour. Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, an American expert on Pakistani affairs, in a recent interview, vividly said that Pakistan has been following a policy of colonization in Afghanistan. Along with that, the military government should make all efforts to eliminate militancy from the Pakistani society. No matter how much we cooperate with the Americans, any weaknesses on the part of the rulers would seriously jeopardize our nuclear as well as missile facilities. If the Americans felt that the government in Islamabad is too weak to protect the facilities from Pakistani extremist groups, they would not hesitate to damage our very precious assets. Already a hint has been given in a September 30th CNN interview of General Pervaiz Musharaf. It was asked that would he destroy the nuclear installations, if they were in the danger of falling in the hands of the militants?

We must understand that Osama bin Laden has a limited agenda, as his concern remains the American troops stationed in the Arabian Peninsula. He has no concern with the welfare of Pakistan or its integrity. In all prudence, the government of Pakistan should be clear that keeping any links with the Talibans and their “ Honored Arab Host” can seriously jeapordize our national interests.

Should Pakistan go nuclear?

The News International Pakistan
May 20, 1998



Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat

Just a few days after the series of nuclear tests, on May 15th India officially declared itself a nuclear-weapon state. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that "India is now a nuclear power with a big bomb." Indian government and media had already created a frenzied environment where officials made repeated threats to the neighbouring Pakistan and China. Former foreign secretaries and chiefs of armed forces were paraded in front of TV cameras, uttering vehement contempt and insult for Pakistan. A routine diplomatic expression gave way to enormous inner hidden hatred.

The Hindu Fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), shot itself in the foot with five nuclear bullets in Rajasthan, and as a fallout entangled Pakistan in the process as well. The form in which the nuclear episode took place has left us with only one option -- to demonstrate that Pakistan can deter as well as retaliate in case of a real nuclear threat from India. The old style "balance of terror" has revisited with South Asian attire and mechanism. We must call their bluff, otherwise be prepared to live as a subservient nation.

It is claimed by the Indian leadership that its country conducted the tests after 24 long years -- ignoring, conveniently the fact that it is after 24 years, since 1974, that for a first time, a chauvinist Hindu Fundamentalist Party - BJP is voted to power, whose leadership as well as rank and file is totally committed to the concept of "greater Hindu rule" in the area.

After the explosions the BJP went on with a systematic and well planned nationalistic sycophancy leaving little room for a rational opinion. Even the most balanced leaders and columnists were and are still taken over by the fast moving ambiance, resulting in little or no opposition against the Indian nuclear option. The BJP government perfected a war-hysteria kicked off by the Prime Minister. India very clearly announced that it had completed "a series of tests" -- implying that there could be more forthcoming. In this context, the reluctance of India to endorse the affirmed document of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is understandable.

On the military front, the BJP leadership made it clear that it is determined to cap its tested
missiles with nuclear warheads. Minister for Science and Technology Murli Manohar Joshi made it clear that the BJP government would soon implement its declared policy. The minister is quoted to have said on May 12 that "Indian scientists will put a nuclear warhead on missiles as soon as the situation requires. The Indian leadership justified the nuclear tests on the basis of security threats. First it was Pakistan alone, then came China. But in reality, as the Chinese spokesman said, it is the Indian hegemonic designs for South Asia, which prompted it to go nuclear.

It is clear that the BJP never abandoned its election manifesto of acquiring nuclear weapons capability. At least two more election promises are left to be executed. The first is the incorporation of the held Kashmir in the Indian Union and the second relates to "getting back;" the "Pakistani occupied Kashmir." In his post-nuclear letter to President Clinton and other world leaders, Prime Minister Vajpayee targeted Pakistan in half of his message. Kashmir and Punjab were mentioned as a core areas of security threat for India and thereby a rationale for the nuclear weapons. While looking at the track record of May 12 and 14, their is no reason that Vajapee's government would not implement the other sections of their election manifesto in letter and spirit.

The security situation for Pakistan's is grave. The Indians have collected a battery of guided missiles like Agni, with a range of 1,800 km, and Prithvi which is already deployed on the Pakistan border can hit its target 250 km away. Also the two nuclear explosions conducted by India later were of tactical nature, designed for the purposes of limited nuclear strike. Surely, the Indian war machine is ready to be equipped with these weapons for field battles.

Pakistan now finds itself in a security impasse. If it tests its nuclear device, enormous western political as well as economic sanctions, from the United States in particular, are sure to follow. We are left with little or no options at all. Deserted by the Western states in the past, Pakistan has to decide for itself and fight its own battle of survival. Even, our traditional allies, will not be coming to support our position. In the last days not a single OIC and ECO nation expressed reservations on the Indian test.

In the circumstances, Pakistan has to take bold and realist steps to preserve its sovereignty
and independence. At least two visible options are before our policy makers.

One, to accept the Western dictate and refrain from demonstrating our deterrent capacity. In this scenario we will receive economic assistance and other financial relief. It can be argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, and again in 1980s, we did receive large economic packages but were unable to develop our infrastructure. The people of Pakistan were left in the lurch to suffer and there is no reason to believe that this time would be any different. In addition, Pakistan would lose its independence and sovereignty and would become an Indian vessel state. Furthermore, it would be forced to sign the CTBT and open up its nuclear installations for inspection -- Iraqi style, thus closing all security options for the future.

Second, If Pakistan goes nuclear, its security will be guaranteed by establishing a retaliatory capacity. That will be a solid deterrent to desist Indian from venturing in Kashmir. Pakistan will test its nuclear capability as a response to the Indian initiation, and to defend its national security interests. We can still hope to persuade our friends in the West to treat us as "good-guys" by making a distinction between a rouge state and others securing their national interest.

We can compensate by our economic well-being through appropriate planning and relying on domestic strengths. While exercising this option, Pakistan must not rush to sign CTBT before the Indians. Also it must clarify that it does not intend to enter any arms race and that our nuclear capability will serve only as a deterrent.

SANCTIONS UNABATED

WEEKLY INDEPENDENT
September 14, 2001

By

Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat


In September this year Pakistan became a target of yet another United States imposed series of sanctions. The recent sanctions entitled Category II, deals with the supply of Chinese components for Missile development. Pakistan is already under sanctions for Category I, which links with the missile itself, while Category II relates to missile parts and technology. The United States insists that the transfers in question violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Pakistan denies any such transfers and regards these newest of new sanctions as unwarranted and one sided. One has to bear in mind that by any definition and logic the recent action of the American government can be categorized as a deliberate attempt to enforce a targeted or selective policy to punish Pakistan and the act is not in violation of any international law. Understandably, the U.S. collaborates with Sharon's Israel for Arrow ballistic missile development.

Pakistan can clearly be regarded as the most sanctioned nation. There are imposed sanctions of varying categories, ranging from arms embargo to economic - spreading over five layers. Nowhere in history do we find an example where an ally was subjected to such a huge degree of discrimination and punitive actions. And in no times can we find an instance where a subjected nation would repeatedly approach the punisher for a relief. To borrow from Edward Said, even if we appeal to the United States for six thousandth times we would get the same response that we should stop all terrorist activities and comply with the policies of the sole super power of the epoch. It seems that Pakistan is on the edge of being declared as a “Terrorist or minimum a Rogue State”.

It becomes apparent that Pakistan is being linked with the “Afghan Sanctions Regime”. Recently the UN Security Council criticized the Kabul regime’s “continued support for international terrorism, refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, and failure to comply with its resolutions”. The Security Council declared that Afghan government must fully comply with the decision of the Council. In a similar action by the Council, it was decided that more than fifty per cent of 15 UN monitors of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team should be deployed at Pak-Afghan borders, to enforce arms transfer from Pakistan. A strong link between the Talibans and uncontrolled militant gangs in Pakistan are highly suspected by the world at large. A remarkable reality is that on Afghanistan, all permanent members of the UN Security Council are of the same view. There exists a unanimity of interests towards that country, to which Shanghai five is a clear testimony.

With the imposing of recent sanctions, Pakistan can be easily categorized as a country under tremendous international pressures of varying degree. The process of isolation was gradual, starting with the 1965 arms embargo, during the September War with India. Pakistan was subjected to every possible adverse regional activity and was unable to blend vital interests with the changing international and regional scenes.

The stage for the enforcement of Pakistan related Sanctions Regime was already set even before the nuclear blasts of May 1998. Realizing that it alone was left in the International economic system to enforce the values of the post-cold war era, the United States started to pursue vigorously a certain set of principles. At the same instance it made it clear in numerous policy projections and actions that the violators of the new rules would be dealt with severely.
A cruel crunch came when economically vulnerable Pakistan found it hard to cope with the post-nuclear economic sanctions imposed by the American-led grouping of industrialized nations. The misery is further aggravated as Pakistan heavily relies on International monitory linkages/financial assistance, with an added handicap of huge financial debt. Aware of Pakistan's weak trade and industrial base, on April 15th, 2000, President Bill Clinton, while addressing the people of Pakistan on Pakistan TV, said in clear terms that Pakistan must comply (at that time the issue was signing of the CTBT), in order to become part of the new International system. What President Clinton implied and which his spokes people in Washington, D.C. further elaborated, was a clear signal to Pakistan that without economic assistance, Pakistan cannot even sustain its security through nuclear weapons. A linkage was thus established between a compliance to a certain demand and Pakistan related economic sanctions.

The question of the timings and the implications of the series of imposed Sanctions and other possible forthcoming becomes a crucial dilemma for Pakistan’s security. Without the presence of such public bodies like the National Assembly and the Senate the defense becomes even more difficult. Even more crucial implication of the CTBT question refers to the subject of the imposition or lifting of the Economic Sanctions, especially by the United States - not to be ignored are the U.S. allies like Japan and Germany, in particular. Another adverse environment, in which we have to operate, is the inability of Pakistan's capacity to re-establish effective links with the traditional friends like Iran, Turkey and other Middle East countries. Such regional organizations like Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) are in disarray, the Commonwealth and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have snubbed us enough to attach any hope on them.

The compound mechanism of global and bi-lateral relations, as explained above, brings in light the vital question of Economic Sanctions on Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has been isolated effectively, in political terms and more so in economic fields. Thus, the imposing or lifting of Economic Sanctions by the U.S. in particular becomes a vital concern for our policy makers. The multi-dimensional repercussions, as it occurs in either situation, should become a focus of investigation.

The United States has applied economic sanctions as a "part of a coherent strategy." The U.S. has used the policy of Economic Sanctions frequently, especially after 1993. All Sanctions of this category were applied as an intentional tool of coercion and were enforced 111 times since World War I and 104 times since 1945. Since 1993 the frequency of economic coercive acts multiplied and was enforced in at least 61 instances. More than half of the economic sanctions in the last 82 years have been imposed since 1993 (in only 4 years according to June, 1998 estimates). The U.S. coercive methods to use the Economic instrument include countries like Sudan, Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Pakistan and India (1998).

The effectiveness of the economic sanctions as an instrument of policy is being debated in the United States. The intentions of the Economic Sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy are clearly spelled out by Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs while testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee. On June 03, 1998, i.e., just after the Indian nuclear test of May 11 and 13, followed by Pakistan's underground series of tests on May 28 and May 30 the Under Secretary said: "Sanctions are most effective when they have broad multinational support and participation. Multilateral sanctions maximize international pressure on the offending state. They show unity of international purpose. And because they are multilateral, these sanctions regimes are more difficult to evade or avoid…"

He went on to state that the sanctions can only be "truly effective means for influencing the policies and behavior of other countries", if they are supported at international level, especially by the industrialized economic powers. The statement implies that in the past some of the sanctioned nations have evaded these constraints by breaching the isolation circle. This became possible by a well thought comprehensive strategy, accompanied by superior diplomatic achievements, as in the case of Iran - while Pakistan was unable to perform such a feat.

One side of the argument is that by signing the CTBT, as demanded by Japan on September 6th of this year, Pakistan can avoid the snow-ball effects of international pressures; thus negating the adverse impact of the economic action. On the contrary, the negative implications of a single-item agenda remain strong, i.e., even if we abide by the demands of the CTBT as expressed by the Japanese.

After assessing Pakistan's potential dangers and dilemmas, certain policy postures are recommended with an inference that we are able to successfully deal within a highly complicated surroundings and issues.

The presumptions are that signing the CTBT alone would not release economic and political pressures on Pakistan. The United States is not going to encourage any substantial financial activity, nor will there be a regional and international acceptability. Pakistan must take further steps within a framework of a five point "package-Action", meaning that:

- It must stop close links with the Talibans and cooperate with the friendly regional states to establish a multi-national government in Kabul.

- Accept the Hurriyet Conference as the sole representatives of the Kashmiri people and support their decisions;, i.e., in stead of mulling the issue with the Indians.

- Impose Ban and take strict action against all terrorist groups in the country. The Interior Minister is on record to have said that his government is considering taking action against four terrorist gangs; while a meek and confusing action was taken against the two non-visible organisations.

- Pakistan must return to the elected Parliament and the Senate much earlier than announced. Even Pakistan's closest allies in the Muslim World are hesitant to accept the military regime. Unnecessary delays are going to pose more problems for the already distorted society. In July 2001, Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary for South Asia in the State Department, clearly said that "Section 508 of the sanctions on Pakistan could not be lifted until President Bush is able to certify that democracy is restored". She further elaborated that in this matter the U.S. President has "no waiver authority".

- All the mentioned five actions must be taken simultaneously. That will release immediate regional and international pressures and Pakistan can get sufficient space to plan its dynamic future.

AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"

FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN

November 6, 2006

Reviewer: SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.

In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.

In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.

General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control.

"In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed.

General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D.

Columbia, Maryland

The Massacre at Bajaur

November 05, 2006

S. Farooq Hasnat

On October 3oth, the Pakistan army, as according to its own admission, wittingly killed scores of Pakistanis in the Khar village, located in Bajaur Agency, near the Afghan border. The army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan, gloating over the “success” claimed that in this operation gunship helicopters and precision weapons were used. Some eyewitnesses claimed that it was the American Predator Drone that fired missiles at the site, while the Pakistani official said that the Americans only provided intelligence. The Bajaur political officials barred local and representatives of foreign news agencies from entering the vicinity where this massacre took place. A noted newspaper editorial remarked that “the decision to ban journalists’ entry into the Bajaur agency is not prudent. It suggests that the government may have much to hide.”

In the first week of October, Foreign Minister Kasuri was reported to have said that Pakistan has made clear (to the U.S.) that it would not kill its own people in the tribal areas. He said that “use of military force is not the solution of problems and political matters are resolved through talks.” A CNN interview quoted his saying that “…there’s a time when not just brawn but brains are also needed,” Foreign Minister told CNN’s Late Edition. “Sometimes what happens is that when you have acts of violence you end up alienating the local population.”

The attack at Khar came as a surprise and as a tragic incident, for the people of Pakistan. The residents of Bajaur were shocked as they were gearing up for a North Waziristan type peace agreement. The signing ceremony was to take place after few hours.

It should be pointed out that the American officials have been critical of the previous peace deal between the government of Pakistan and the residents of the tribal areas, in North Waziristan. Apparently, the Bush administration demands the Pakistan government to use high handed methods against its own people. No matter, why and how it happened, there is no excuse for killing more than 80 Pakistanis. The manner in which this attack was conducted and the approach through which the government spokesmen justified it, raises lots of questions and doubts. A renowned Human Rights Organisation Amnesty International issued a statement saying that “if these killings were deliberate and took place without first attempting to arrest suspected offenders, without warning, without the suspects offering armed resistance, and in circumstances in which suspects posed no immediate risk to security forces, the killings are considered extrajudicial executions in violation of international human rights law.” There is enough evidence by the foreign and Pakistani journalists that there were children at the premises and that the air attack was more than from the Pakistani air force. As mentioned earlier just after few hours a peace treaty was going to be signed with the tribal elders, on the same pattern as that of Waziristan. Part of the North Waziristan deal read, “There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency. The writ of the state will prevail in the area”. Those who carried out December 30 Bajaur killings did so to sabotage peace in the tribal areas and as a consequence the unity of Pakistan is undermined and Army’s image is further tarnished.

Some analysts like Hassan Abbas argue that a high percentage of Pashtoon representation in the Army led to the Waziristan agreement. While others agree that in reality the Army suffered a “defeat” at the battle ground. According to government’s own admission more than 700 of its men lost their lives. The Army just fled as they have done before, in East Pakistan and Kargil. This was in spite of the fact that more than 80,000 Pakistani military troops are deployed along the tribal areas of the Afghan border. It was believed at that time that the best option for the establishment was to talk to the tribesmen through their representatives.

Another category of arguments goes that it was a pro Taliban faction with which the government entered into an agreement in Waziristan. The Taliban of the 1990s were prompted and encouraged by the Army and the tribes were made to believe that by supporting the Taliban they were helping the Pakistan Army, if not Pakistan, itself. Then, came that famous somersault in 2001. Any expert on human psychology would agree that it’s not an easy matter for the groups with conviction (instilled or otherwise) to turnaround and change their opinion, overnight. The change in attitudes comes through dialogue and persuasion. The use of force in such circumstances is counter productive and harmful for the unity and strength of the country.

There have been so many blames as well as blunders assigned to the Pakistan Army that it has become indefensible even for a relentless ally of the establishment to validate their performance. It is unfortunate that a national institution has lost its professionalism to a great extent. The obvious reason being the heavy involvement of the generals in politicking and their greed for wealth and other undue privileges (See the findings of Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report).They have too many stakes to guard – strict adherence to professionalism becomes the last option.

The crux of the matter is that one person is playing havoc with the civil, military and social institutions of Pakistan. His most serious crime in the eyes of many Pakistanis is that apart from tearing down the national institutions he is also deforming the language, culture, heritage and above all the sovereignty of Pakistan

Musharraf: Struggling for legitimacy

WEEKLY INDEPENDENT

Issue 49 Volume 04, May 26 - June 01, 2005

There seems to be no end to Musharraf's controversial rule. His appetite for power remains unlimited and his desire to flout the democratic traditions has no confines

Syed Farooq Hasnat

On May 18, 2005 the Pakistani official spokesman said that General Pervez Musharraf would continue to hold office beyond 2007. With this statement there seems to be no end to Musharraf's controversial rule. His appetite for power remains unlimited and his desire to flout the democratic traditions of Pakistan has no confines. His only rationale to be in power is his self-proclaimed indispensability against international terrorism. He sends the message that the forces of extremism would take over Pakistan, more so its nuclear assets, once he is out of power. In fact it's just the opposite, as illegal control would in fact encourage militancy in Pakistan. It would undermine the genuine national political parties and would inculcate a culture of distrust and greed. All these factors taken together would further weaken not strengthen the Pakistani society.

As witnessed in Afghanistan, unstable societies are a hotbed for extremist tendencies. The new world order presented a value system, according to which the human rights and democratic institutions were to be encouraged and enforced.

By the end of the last century it became unthinkable that in countries where democratic institutions were in place could follow any other path. The emphasis was on the strengthening of the institutions; its rollback was not conceived. On 12th October 1999, Pakistan became an exception when its military took over power, sacked the elected Prime Minister (no matter how controversial he was), dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies and suspended the constitution. This was the fourth time that the army had intervened, through martial law, although this time it was not declared as such. The promised takings of the post-coup regime were stereotypes, such as a promise of free and fair elections, bringing true democracy in the country and eradication of corruption. It was an echo of the previous military dictatorships of General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan and General Ziaul Haq.

Soon after his takeover, addressing a press conference, General Musharraf affirmed that he would remain in office for not more than three years. Since 1958, the direct military rule in Pakistan is spread for about three decades. From 1985 to 1988 General Ziaul Haq installed a civilian Prime Minister, but kept the powers in his office, by grossly amending the 1973 Constitution. After the death of General Zia, a political process started as a result of 1988 elections, with an expectation that future Pakistan would move towards a civil society. For nearly 11 years (1988-1999) Pakistan Muslim League, under Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto alternately shared power. Within the mainstream politics, for the first time, a two party system emerged, promising that it would provide a kind of political stability that was not seen before - although, both the leaders could not use their authority to strengthen the institutions, political or otherwise. These governments lacked seriousness of purpose and agendas for the future. Their commitment to the welfare of the people was weak and the matters that affected the real lives of the people were never addressed. Whenever the opportunity arose, these two leaders would jump to cooperate with the military establishment. In fact, when in opposition they would send feelers to the Commander-in-Chief to intervene. The civilian governments failed to allow a democratic culture to take its roots in the polity of Pakistan.

However, in spite of all its flaws, the political process was captivating the foundations of a democratic culture. More so, the participation of the people was being reflected, in one way or the other. It was believed that uninterrupted political process would ultimately bring a civil society in place and that Pakistan would get rid of the menace of military takeovers. The frail political governments were not all that meek. The military interference was challenged from time to time and measures were taken to take command of the armed forces. One of the fragile Prime Ministers, Muhammad Khan Junejo, boldly challenged the corruption and non-professionalism within the armed forces. Just before his ouster, apart from other acts to curtail the ambitious generals, he had ordered an inquiry into the Ojheri weaponry site blast of April 10, 1988, which was suspected to be masterminded by an army general. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 8, 1998 removed the Amy Chief General Jehangir Karamat for his interference in politics and a naval chief was dismissed on corruption charges. No matter Nawaz Sharif wanted to clip the wings of the Generals to enhance his personal power, but these actions fit well in explaining a delicate balance between the military and the civilian authority - where ultimately the civilian governments lost the battle for control.On its part, the military sat on the fences, putting pressures on at least three main concerns of Pakistan, namely the nuclear issue, the Kashmir issue and the Afghanistan issue. The military pushed the weak political governments to accommodate the retired Generals at key civilian positions, severely compromising the efficiency of the national institutions. Apart from that the military got increasingly involved in taking control of the economic institutions of the country, their corporate interests got more expanded with every new opportunity. With that the stories of corruption and nepotism became a household talk.

Immediately after the coup, Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf held a one-and-a-half-hour meeting with the Ambassador of the United States, William B. Milam, which, according to some sources, was described as 'good'. It was quoted that the American Ambassador gave a patient hearing to the military ruler and, heard with interest his agenda to solve Pakistan's unresolved issues. It was known that General Pervez Musharraf wanted to get a nod from the United States, which was the sole super power, with ability to influence the world/regional events. General Musharraf's legitimacy as a military ruler, could not come from the people of Pakistan and he understood that well.

Anxious as he was, the General was desperate to legitimise his rule by whatever means. Like his predecessor General Ziaul Haq, General Musharraf in 2002 undertook to legitimise his rule by holding a national referendum. Like General Zia, the system could not gain legitimacy by the law of necessity doctrine alone, so generously applied by the highest court in Pakistan. The referendum question was: "For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of Quaid-e-Azam, would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as President of Pakistan for five years?" A number of people reportedly cared to vote but the General declared himself as the President for the next five years. Interestingly, later the General admitted that the referendum was flawed but he would still keep his post for the next five years. The Washington Post in its editorial of April 12, 2002 had suggested that the Bush administration's support for the General in holding a referendum would be a mistake, unless he is willing to "work within a legitimate democratic system". But political expediency overcame all other values. Even today, the question of legitimacy is grave for the President. In spite of the inherent flaws in the procedure, at the eve of that legitimising exercise, a number of questions were raised. It was argued that, "the referendum results could be termed authentic only if the next elected parliament and the provincial assemblies validate them. Secondly, the President must not amend the constitution unnecessarily. Thirdly, the newly elected President must not manipulate the forthcoming general elections. Fourthly, once his election is validated by the newly-elected legislatures, General Musharraf should retire as the Chief of Army Staff." On all accounts, the General failed to fulfill any of the conditions and thus even after three years, questions about his legitimacy as a head of the State and government remain on the horizon.By the first quarter of 2005, the Pakistani society had become a hallmark of misrule, as widespread corruption and mediocre became the standard norm.

At the macro level the issues of the legitimacy of the regime and sovereignty of the nation remains the two main concerns for the people of Pakistan. A unanimous view exists that under the repeated military interventions, the Pakistani society has grossly worsened and help is needed in all fields. A renowned Pakistani Professor noted that the national "politics has been reduced to a mere game of chess and with the exception of rare voices in the wilderness, transcendental principles have no relevance in statecraft". He further adds "…for all the claims of realism and pragmatism, the problems of an economy in shambles, law and order in disarray and education in tatters, and not addressed. Politics has fallen into disrepute because the practitioners of realpolitik do not appear to have a clear vision of the chronic ills of our society. In the realm of thought, we are going in the dark".

The Pakistani society today is a sad picture of the collapse of all institutions and a widespread degeneration in the society. People have been led to shortcuts, greed, and other illegal means, thus paving ways for incompetence and corruption. Nearly every programme that was launched by the military government, failed to achieve its goals, education being the major victim.Pakistan represents more of a society resembling a medieval rule, with a resemblance of the dark ages of the Muslim civilisation, than a modern Islamic nation with well-established structures of a civil society. Professor Stephen Cohen remarks, "If he (General Musharraf) resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yahya Khan - also a well-intentioned general who did the United States a great service". The professor further hinted that Musharraf has rented his country to the more powerful states. General Musharraf gets his legitimacy from outside as he fails to get from the people of Pakistan.

The writer is former Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science, Punjab University. He settled in the US after serving the Punjab University for 28 years. He is Adjunct Scholar at Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

Email: Hasnatf1@yahoo.com

Pakistan President Released Al Qaeda Suspects

The New York Sun

September 22, 2006 Edition

BY ELI LAKE - Staff Reporter of the SunSeptember 22, 2006

URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/40183



WASHINGTON — When Pakistan's president arrives here on Friday, he will be grilled about his decision this month to release more than 1,000 prisoners, some of whom are suspected to be high-value Al Qaeda operatives.

The problem for the White House is that America does not know which prisoners were released as part of a ceasefire agreement the Pakistani military signed with tribal leaders in the border province of Waziristan. Pakistani officials have yet to share the names with their American counterparts, according to an intelligence official and an administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The officials said one of the White House's top goals for the meeting between President Musharraf and President Bush is to persuade the Pakistani leader to give up the dossier on the prisoners. While Bush administration officials have publicly praised the agreement — whereby 80,000 Pakistani soldiers will remain in Waziristan but will not conduct house-to-house raids or other intrusive patrols — privately it is viewed with more suspicion. In the last week, scant details of those released from the Pakistani prisons have surfaced in the local press in Waziristan, as well as in the London DailyTelegraph.

Pakistani officials have downplayed the prisoner release. In a story on the UPI news wire this week, a spokesman for Mr. Musharraf said that only a few dozen local fighters were released.
But Langley and the Pentagon do not share this view, the intelligence official told The New York Sun yesterday. "Frankly, we are very worried about this," he said. "We can't get straight answers on who was released."

The administration official said, "We know they are releasing some individuals. The $64,000 question is: Who are they?"

Two names that have surfaced in the Pakistani press are Ghulam Mustapha, a man American intelligence considers to be a top fixer for Pakistan's jihadist community, and Fazl Raziq, a Pakistani national thought to be a top aide to Osama bin Laden. Many analysts here believe Mr. bin Laden is hiding in Waziristan.

One concern for the intelligence community is whether Omar Sayed Sheikh was among the released prisoners. "I have been asking about this for a week now," the intelligence official said of Mr. Sheikh, who is one of the men alleged to have killed a Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, in 2002. "I am not getting any straight answers.

The atmosphere surrounding Mr. Musharraf's visit is already strained. On Wednesday, Mr. Bush told CNN that he would send American troops to Pakistan if he thought he could capture Mr. bin Laden. Mr. Musharraf countered yesterday that his country would never accept foreign soldiers on its soil. That point was underscored when the body of an Afghan national, Wazir Khan, was found in the main town of Waziristan, Mirin Shah, yesterday with a note attached that read in part: "See the body of this man who was spying for America. Anyone doing such a thing will face the same fate," according to the Associated Press.

Despite the tension leading up to the meeting, the White House yesterday played up the get-together as a routine parley between two allies in the war on terror. A White House spokeswoman, Dana Perino, told reporters: "As we've said before, Pakistan is an important partner in the war on terror and a friend to the United States.We've had excellent cooperation in many areas, including counterterrorism. And the president has repeatedly said how much he appreciates Musharraf's commitment to pursuing Al Qaeda and continuing to work with us in cooperation in the search for Osama bin Laden. Pakistan and the United States remain close allies, working not only on the war on terror together, but on many other areas."

An analyst at the Middle East Institute, Syed Hasnat, said Mr. Musharraf had to sign the deal with the Waziri tribal leaders because the military occupation was not working.

"The Pakistani government asked the tribal leaders to hand over Al Qaeda to them. Many of them though had nothing to do with insurgency. This agreement was signed for peace and tranquility," he said. "The Pakistani army failed to take control of the region militarily."

Mr. Musharraf will be in America until next week. He is scheduled to meet with Mr. Bush and President Karzai of Afghanistan on Tuesday.

September 22, 2006 Edition > Section: Foreign > Printer-Friendly Version