Wednesday, November 29, 2006

Changed scenario of Kashmir conflict

By S. Farooq Hasnat


Issue 03 Volume 05, July 07 - 13, 2005

In the past, the policymakers mishandled the Kashmir issue, today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course of action for freedom




For more than one-and-a-half years, General Musharraf has been bending backwards to accommodate the Indian leaders. His declared intention is to resolve the Kashmir dispute, during his tenure in office. On one occasion he said that the dispute could be resolved in two weeks. To engage the Indian leadership, he took a number of steps including his New Delhi and Agra visits and withdrawal of ban on Kashmiris travel across the Line of Control. Along with that, meetings between the officials of the two countries were initiated to look into Siachen Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Baglihar dam and other disputes.
The critics of Musharraf's policy of reconciliation with India argue that although he offered many concessions, one after another, he got little in return. They further said that in real terms, a tacit understanding with India has been undertaken that the Line of Control (LoC) will be converted into an international border between the two countries. The General refutes these allegations and says that his proposals do not negate the principled stance of Pakistan. As a result of these developments, the tensions between the two countries eased out, but so far no substantial progress has been made, either on 'minor' issues or on Kashmir itself. However, the single most significant headway was the two-week long visit of the nine Kashmiri leaders, of which five were from the 'moderate' wing of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The snag of the visit was the absence of Syed Ali Geelani, leader of his own faction of the Hurriyat. He declined the Pakistani invitation by saying that he had decided to show his 'resentment' of what he called Pakistan government's 'deviation from its stand on Kashmir'. He further said that India has not shifted from its standpoint on Kashmir and he was not sure what he will bring back from the Pakistan visit. It was felt in Pakistan that Geelani's decision had dampened the initiative to start a dialogue with the Kashmiri leaders in held Kashmir. After all, Syed Ali Geelani was the one who once called himself 'a proud Pakistani'. Another key Kashmiri, Shabbir Shah wrote, 'Kashmiri' in the Indian passport application's citizenship column, and was refused the passport.
The Hurriyat leaders' visit to Pakistan changed the whole scenario of the Kashmir dispute, when they clearly made home their point that any future solution to the Kashmir issue must be initiated by the Kashmiris, themselves. They further said that they would not accept, as has been a practice in the past, that Kashmir is labelled as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India.Hurriyat's key spokesman and held Kashmir's spiritual leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq even denied the relevance of the 1948 resolutions, of the United Nations Security Council. These utterances made irrelevant the long drawn position of Pakistan, for which it worked hard for five decades. Mirwaiz, on his return to Srinagar, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times, saying that it will not be acceptable to split Kashmir on the basis of 'religion, ethnic or regional divisions'. He further wrote that his group intends to continue a dialogue with Pakistan as well as the Indian leadership, on separate tracks. According to him, "This will give Kashmiris a sense of genuine involvement, a must for any progress towards resolution". Mirwaiz made it clear that attempts to converge the LoC into a permanent international boundary would be a reprehensible action. These remarks by the Kashmiri leaders sent ripples across the relevant circles in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. There is no doubt that one main fallout of the Hurriyat visit is that the initiative has been taken away from Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves have taken the driving seat. While addressing thousands of Kashmiris, at a mosque in Srinagar, after his return from landmark 14 days visit to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, Mirwaiz declared that General Musharraf told him "Any solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir will be acceptable to Pakistan". This is not what the Pakistani military leadership had expected. After all it marginalised Pakistan's position and the circumstances are moving fast towards the conception of an independent Kashmir. Another aspect to be considered is that whether the gestures by the Indian government are to defuse as well confuse the issue or are serious attempts to resolve the dispute according to the desires of the Kashmiri people. Representing this viewpoint, a noted Lahore daily wrote in its editorial of June 22, that "The whole idea behind the façade of Indian sincerity in resolving disputes one hears so much about, is to achieve normalisation with Pakistan, extract the maximum concessions from it in the economic and commercial spheres and stabilise peaceful conditions in the Subcontinent. It seems under the impression that it has found the present government in Islamabad a willing partner."Many in Pakistan feel that the establishment fall prey to its own manoeuvring, where before the visit, little or no homework was done. It is also believed that confused, unclear and foreign formulas were destined to meet this fate. To a certain extent, the grievances of the Kashmiri leaders are justified.
The Kashmir dispute was dealt by both the warring neighbours as purely a territorial dispute. Whenever, and at whatever level the matter was discussed, the role of the Kashmiri people was ignored. It had become purely an issue within the larger range of Pakistan-India bilateral relations. More than 80,000 Kashmiris have lost their lives and countless women have been raped since the 1989 home grown revolt against the 700,000-strong Indian forces, but these gross human rights violations remained part of the bilateral dispute.When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, jihadis stepped up their activities in Kashmir. But it blemished the legitimate Kashmiri struggle. At the same time, as a result of jihadi fallout, the Pakistani society suffered tremendously, in the shape of rising militancy and violence. Steve Coll, a critic of Pakistan policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir writes: "Infrastructure needed to produce jihadists proved corrosive for Pakistani society, a development not appreciated at that time by those who developed the strategy. As it turned out, a heavy price was paid for the reliance on groups whose members were deeply committed to fundamentalism. Often these groups began to penetrate Pakistani society." The settlement of the Kashmir dispute will always be difficult, as stakes are very high for India, for Pakistan and for the freedom-fighters. It has to be accepted that the lingering Kashmir dispute is highly complex as well as emotionally charged, for all the concerned parties. Moreover, the post-9/11 world, where the Americans are enforcing their agenda, makes even a genuine Kashmiri armed struggle for freedom more difficult. It is in this context that an assessment as well as solution to the Kashmir dispute is to be made. There are certain compulsions that must be mentioned under which Pakistan has to operate. Pakistan supporting the freedom-fighters' armed struggle, either tacitly or otherwise, would not be acceptable under the norms of the new international value system.
The era of jihadi groups is over. Nowhere in the future would the world community accept these groups as a valid means of struggle for the right of self-determination. In the past, the Pakistani policymakers mishandled the Kashmir issue and today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course of action for freedom, where even the meaning of freedom has to be rewritten.

Thursday, November 09, 2006

RESCUING PAKISTAN



WEEKLY INDEPENDENT
October 04, 2001

Taliban and their Pakistani supporters have very little comprehension of the recent developments around them and have no clue regarding the security hazards to Pakistan_________________________



by Dr. S Farooq Hasnat



If one examines the recent statements of Pakistan government functionaries, an impression is given that instead of adopting a clear-cut policy towards Afghanistan, there exists a lack of conviction as well as confidence in Islamabad.


A segment of the population read it as a signal of sympathy for the Talibans while others interpret it as an outright support for the American position against International Terrorism. Another part of the population is of the view that the government in Islamabad accepted the American conditions under duress. There are still others who firmly believe that the decision makers are playing "hard to get" with the Americans.


The reality is that the government wants to keep all parties guessing and satisfied at the same time. There is one danger which goes together with this policy -- that with the arrival of the ultimate, it would annoy all actors in the Afghan riddle and would destabilize the society still further. As a consequence, the people of Pakistan are confused and the apprehensions are regarding the wrong messages being sent to the wrong people. It would become still serious if the international community's perception is not corrected in a positive direction, notwithstanding that on a number of occasions assurances are being made to the international anti-terrorist collision that every effort will be made to go along with the new fight against terror.


From September 11th onwards at least two high-powered delegations visited Kandhar virtually begging Mullah Umar to listen to reason and take appropriate steps to defuse the situation. The latest delegation of September 29th was assigned to convince the Talibans to comprehend the requirements of the changing global realities. The demand also included releasing the arrested aid workers. Although the official circles denied, the delegations had the blessings of the Islamabad establishment and were accompanied by high-ranking military officials including the Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Lt. General Mehmood. No other than Mullah Umar's teacher formed a part of the good-will delegation from Pakistan.


On their return, one of the companions of the ten-member delegation said, "we did not discuss Osama. He was not on our agenda". While the Afghan Council in Karachi explained: "It is not possible that clerics of such a caliber would make such irresponsible demands, because without evidence, the Americans would never give up a person. So why should we be expected to do that?" Even a list presented of 40 Pakistani terrorists that had taken refuge in the Afghan territory was not entertained.


The recent expressions clearly demonstrate that little progress was made, from Pakistan's perception, in solving the crisis. The enigma is that the similar ideological views pushed the Talibanised Pakistani Ulemas to be more inclined towards Afghanistan. Not long ago, one such leader said on record if a choice is to be made between the two countries, he would choose Afghanistan. Reacting to the second delegation's return, the Foreign Office spokesperson sheepishly admitted: "Both Afghan leadership and Ulema have reaffirmed their commitment to security, safety and integrity of the two neighbouring nations. Both the parties agreed to be in contact with each other and that another meeting might take over as and when necessary". Such casual remarks in the fast moving events, which threaten Pakistan's security, speak volumes for themselves. The official announcement reflects lack of clarity and proper management crisis riddle of the country's policy.


Furthermore, it seems clear that the Talibans and their Pakistani supporters have very little comprehension of the recent developments around them and have no clue regarding the security hazards to Pakistan or alternatively they are getting wrong signals from the Islamabad power circles. It is said by Mullah Umar's critics that the Kabul militia is completely ignorant about the complications of the regional as well as global system and that they operate purely on pre-Islamic tribal traditions. Depriving the girls to attend schools, closing down the television station, prohibiting the women to consult male doctors, even if the disease relates to a complicated brain surgery are just few examples to support the arguments. A glaring contradiction is that if the girls are not educated, then how can lady doctors be produced in the first place. The Tabibans have no answers to these logical questions.


As the Pakistani government was beating around the bush, it was reported that the American and the British commandos were already operating in Afghanistan, a news that was neither denied nor confirmed by the US officials - an indication that the Pakistani efforts to engage the Talibans are of little consequence for the American policy strategists. In parallel but contradictory developments, Pakistan was quick to ban Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Kashmir related organization and froze the accounts of the Al Rashid Trust, as desired by the US State Department and the United Nations Security Council's unanimous resolution of September 29th. The resolution said in part: "Freeze without delay" the resources of terrorists and terror organizations". It also put restrictions by demanding from the member countries to "deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, or provide save havens".


In short, even at this critical hour, the Pakistani establishment does not have a coordinated Afghan policy, nor is there any desire of having one. In fact it never had a long-term strategy on the Afghan situation ever since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Time and again it was being advocated that external interference in Afghanistan has always met with failures. But those who said the loudest themselves violated this basic principle.Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto's second tenure never hesitated to interfere in the Afghan affairs, a tradition that was carried on by the successive governments. These regimes nourished and encouraged the Talibans in their civil war against the Northern Alliance, caring little for the growing civil rights violations and ignoring the vital interests of Pakistan. Even today, a mind set is visible in the Foreign Office and amongst the various sections of the ruling elite, that Pakistan must obstruct any settlement, which would dislodge the Talibans from Kabul. They regard it as a perfect model for preserving Pakistan's security interests. However, the reality is far from what the Pakistani elite perceives. As a direct result of interfering in the Afghan affairs, the Pakistan society had to confront at least two evils - first in the form of branding ourselves with the terrorists and the second related to the ideological decay in our society. The first is reflected in the worldwide suspicion of Pakistan's involvement in international terrorism - thus isolating Pakistan, both in the regional as well as in its international environments.


Most dangerous of all the Pakistani status as a responsible nuclear power has come under strict scrutiny. Even in the hour of dire security risk, no regional country is prepared to establish close diplomatic coordination with Pakistan and the government is finding it extremely difficult to invite itself even to the friendliest of the friendly Muslim community of nations. Pakistan's contacts have not exceeded beyond telephonic conversations. On the contrary, the rest of Afghanistan neighbours have established Afghan related contacts with the regional nations. To illustrate, Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi visited Lebanon, Syria and above all Egypt with whom it does not enjoy cordial relations and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members stepped up their coordinating efforts as well and same goes for the Central Asian Republics.


The other adverse fall out of interference in the Afghan affairs distorted the traditional Pakistani society, hitting at its ideological roots, notwithstanding the gun and drug culture. The Pakistani society was constructed on the premises of love and peace. The Sufis and poets like Shah Abdul Latif Bhatai, Khwaja Ghulam Farid, Waris Shah, Khushal Khan Khattak, Bullay Shah and many others preached message of love, kindness, compassion and tolerance. Under the influence of these saints, the Pakistani society knew no other norms but of Islamic tenderness - until a few decades back the Talibanisation started to take its roots in the pure land. While the successive governments looked the other way, the pre-Islamic creed of religious cults and gangs introduced hate, murder and bigotry in the minds of the Pakistani youth. Murder and attacks on the mosques of those who resisted this alien creed became a common occurrence. Taking advantage of rampant poverty and unemployment, the youth were taken from their mothers' laps, brain washed and dispatched un-prepared to the war-zones, where either they disappeared or their dead bodies arrived home. All this was done in the name of jihad and Islam. The Talibans had declared their civil war with the fellow Muslim Northern Alliance as a holy war by issuing a Fatwa in this regard.


Inculcated by the Talibanised Mullas of Pakistan, this poison of hate devastated families all around Pakistan. The love and compassion gave way to the new language of extremism and terrorism. The language of firearms became a fashion of the time and the Pakistani society gradually lost its honor, dignity, sanity and above all its balance. Our society finally succumbed to the alien culture and habits. Different networks established by the Talibanised Pakistanis have close contacts with the Talibans and probably with Osama bin Laden as well. In order to regain its honour and to get rid of the culture of hate and bigotry, the honorable solution for Pakistan would be to keep away from the internal affairs of Afghanistan. We must adopt a rigid "hands off policy" on Afghanistan. Already we are being accused of colonial tendencies towards our Western neighbour. Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, an American expert on Pakistani affairs, in a recent interview, vividly said that Pakistan has been following a policy of colonization in Afghanistan. Along with that, the military government should make all efforts to eliminate militancy from the Pakistani society. No matter how much we cooperate with the Americans, any weaknesses on the part of the rulers would seriously jeopardize our nuclear as well as missile facilities. If the Americans felt that the government in Islamabad is too weak to protect the facilities from Pakistani extremist groups, they would not hesitate to damage our very precious assets. Already a hint has been given in a September 30th CNN interview of General Pervaiz Musharaf. It was asked that would he destroy the nuclear installations, if they were in the danger of falling in the hands of the militants?


We must understand that Osama bin Laden has a limited agenda, as his concern remains the American troops stationed in the Arabian Peninsula. He has no concern with the welfare of Pakistan or its integrity. In all prudence, the government of Pakistan should be clear that keeping any links with the Talibans and their “ Honored Arab Host” can seriously jeapordize our national interests.

Should Pakistan go nuclear?


The News International Pakistan
May 20, 1998



Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat

Just a few days after the series of nuclear tests, on May 15th India officially declared itself a nuclear-weapon state. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that "India is now a nuclear power with a big bomb." Indian government and media had already created a frenzied environment where officials made repeated threats to the neighbouring Pakistan and China. Former foreign secretaries and chiefs of armed forces were paraded in front of TV cameras, uttering vehement contempt and insult for Pakistan. A routine diplomatic expression gave way to enormous inner hidden hatred.

The Hindu Fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), shot itself in the foot with five nuclear bullets in Rajasthan, and as a fallout entangled Pakistan in the process as well. The form in which the nuclear episode took place has left us with only one option -- to demonstrate that Pakistan can deter as well as retaliate in case of a real nuclear threat from India. The old style "balance of terror" has revisited with South Asian attire and mechanism. We must call their bluff, otherwise be prepared to live as a subservient nation.

It is claimed by the Indian leadership that its country conducted the tests after 24 long years -- ignoring, conveniently the fact that it is after 24 years, since 1974, that for a first time, a chauvinist Hindu Fundamentalist Party - BJP is voted to power, whose leadership as well as rank and file is totally committed to the concept of "greater Hindu rule" in the area.

After the explosions the BJP went on with a systematic and well planned nationalistic sycophancy leaving little room for a rational opinion. Even the most balanced leaders and columnists were and are still taken over by the fast moving ambiance, resulting in little or no opposition against the Indian nuclear option. The BJP government perfected a war-hysteria kicked off by the Prime Minister. India very clearly announced that it had completed "a series of tests" -- implying that there could be more forthcoming. In this context, the reluctance of India to endorse the affirmed document of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is understandable.

On the military front, the BJP leadership made it clear that it is determined to cap its tested
missiles with nuclear warheads. Minister for Science and Technology Murli Manohar Joshi made it clear that the BJP government would soon implement its declared policy. The minister is quoted to have said on May 12 that "Indian scientists will put a nuclear warhead on missiles as soon as the situation requires. The Indian leadership justified the nuclear tests on the basis of security threats. First it was Pakistan alone, then came China. But in reality, as the Chinese spokesman said, it is the Indian hegemonic designs for South Asia, which prompted it to go nuclear.

It is clear that the BJP never abandoned its election manifesto of acquiring nuclear weapons capability. At least two more election promises are left to be executed. The first is the incorporation of the held Kashmir in the Indian Union and the second relates to "getting back;" the "Pakistani occupied Kashmir." In his post-nuclear letter to President Clinton and other world leaders, Prime Minister Vajpayee targeted Pakistan in half of his message. Kashmir and Punjab were mentioned as a core areas of security threat for India and thereby a rationale for the nuclear weapons. While looking at the track record of May 12 and 14, their is no reason that Vajapee's government would not implement the other sections of their election manifesto in letter and spirit.

The security situation for Pakistan's is grave. The Indians have collected a battery of guided missiles like Agni, with a range of 1,800 km, and Prithvi which is already deployed on the Pakistan border can hit its target 250 km away. Also the two nuclear explosions conducted by India later were of tactical nature, designed for the purposes of limited nuclear strike. Surely, the Indian war machine is ready to be equipped with these weapons for field battles.

Pakistan now finds itself in a security impasse. If it tests its nuclear device, enormous western political as well as economic sanctions, from the United States in particular, are sure to follow. We are left with little or no options at all. Deserted by the Western states in the past, Pakistan has to decide for itself and fight its own battle of survival. Even, our traditional allies, will not be coming to support our position. In the last days not a single OIC and ECO nation expressed reservations on the Indian test.

In the circumstances, Pakistan has to take bold and realist steps to preserve its sovereignty
and independence. At least two visible options are before our policy makers.

One, to accept the Western dictate and refrain from demonstrating our deterrent capacity. In this scenario we will receive economic assistance and other financial relief. It can be argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, and again in 1980s, we did receive large economic packages but were unable to develop our infrastructure. The people of Pakistan were left in the lurch to suffer and there is no reason to believe that this time would be any different. In addition, Pakistan would lose its independence and sovereignty and would become an Indian vessel state. Furthermore, it would be forced to sign the CTBT and open up its nuclear installations for inspection -- Iraqi style, thus closing all security options for the future.

Second, If Pakistan goes nuclear, its security will be guaranteed by establishing a retaliatory capacity. That will be a solid deterrent to desist Indian from venturing in Kashmir. Pakistan will test its nuclear capability as a response to the Indian initiation, and to defend its national security interests. We can still hope to persuade our friends in the West to treat us as "good-guys" by making a distinction between a rouge state and others securing their national interest.

We can compensate by our economic well-being through appropriate planning and relying on domestic strengths. While exercising this option, Pakistan must not rush to sign CTBT before the Indians. Also it must clarify that it does not intend to enter any arms race and that our nuclear capability will serve only as a deterrent.

SANCTIONS UNABATED


WEEKLY INDEPENDENT
September 14, 2001

By

Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat


In September this year Pakistan became a target of yet another United States imposed series of sanctions. The recent sanctions entitled Category II, deals with the supply of Chinese components for Missile development. Pakistan is already under sanctions for Category I, which links with the missile itself, while Category II relates to missile parts and technology. The United States insists that the transfers in question violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Pakistan denies any such transfers and regards these newest of new sanctions as unwarranted and one sided. One has to bear in mind that by any definition and logic the recent action of the American government can be categorized as a deliberate attempt to enforce a targeted or selective policy to punish Pakistan and the act is not in violation of any international law. Understandably, the U.S. collaborates with Sharon's Israel for Arrow ballistic missile development.


Pakistan can clearly be regarded as the most sanctioned nation. There are imposed sanctions of varying categories, ranging from arms embargo to economic - spreading over five layers. Nowhere in history do we find an example where an ally was subjected to such a huge degree of discrimination and punitive actions. And in no times can we find an instance where a subjected nation would repeatedly approach the punisher for a relief. To borrow from Edward Said, even if we appeal to the United States for six thousandth times we would get the same response that we should stop all terrorist activities and comply with the policies of the sole super power of the epoch. It seems that Pakistan is on the edge of being declared as a “Terrorist or minimum a Rogue State”.


It becomes apparent that Pakistan is being linked with the “Afghan Sanctions Regime”. Recently the UN Security Council criticized the Kabul regime’s “continued support for international terrorism, refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, and failure to comply with its resolutions”. The Security Council declared that Afghan government must fully comply with the decision of the Council. In a similar action by the Council, it was decided that more than fifty per cent of 15 UN monitors of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team should be deployed at Pak-Afghan borders, to enforce arms transfer from Pakistan. A strong link between the Talibans and uncontrolled militant gangs in Pakistan are highly suspected by the world at large. A remarkable reality is that on Afghanistan, all permanent members of the UN Security Council are of the same view. There exists a unanimity of interests towards that country, to which Shanghai five is a clear testimony.


With the imposing of recent sanctions, Pakistan can be easily categorized as a country under tremendous international pressures of varying degree. The process of isolation was gradual, starting with the 1965 arms embargo, during the September War with India. Pakistan was subjected to every possible adverse regional activity and was unable to blend vital interests with the changing international and regional scenes.


The stage for the enforcement of Pakistan related Sanctions Regime was already set even before the nuclear blasts of May 1998. Realizing that it alone was left in the International economic system to enforce the values of the post-cold war era, the United States started to pursue vigorously a certain set of principles. At the same instance it made it clear in numerous policy projections and actions that the violators of the new rules would be dealt with severely.
A cruel crunch came when economically vulnerable Pakistan found it hard to cope with the post-nuclear economic sanctions imposed by the American-led grouping of industrialized nations. The misery is further aggravated as Pakistan heavily relies on International monitory linkages/financial assistance, with an added handicap of huge financial debt. Aware of Pakistan's weak trade and industrial base, on April 15th, 2000, President Bill Clinton, while addressing the people of Pakistan on Pakistan TV, said in clear terms that Pakistan must comply (at that time the issue was signing of the CTBT), in order to become part of the new International system. What President Clinton implied and which his spokes people in Washington, D.C. further elaborated, was a clear signal to Pakistan that without economic assistance, Pakistan cannot even sustain its security through nuclear weapons. A linkage was thus established between a compliance to a certain demand and Pakistan related economic sanctions.


The question of the timings and the implications of the series of imposed Sanctions and other possible forthcoming becomes a crucial dilemma for Pakistan’s security. Without the presence of such public bodies like the National Assembly and the Senate the defense becomes even more difficult. Even more crucial implication of the CTBT question refers to the subject of the imposition or lifting of the Economic Sanctions, especially by the United States - not to be ignored are the U.S. allies like Japan and Germany, in particular. Another adverse environment, in which we have to operate, is the inability of Pakistan's capacity to re-establish effective links with the traditional friends like Iran, Turkey and other Middle East countries. Such regional organizations like Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) are in disarray, the Commonwealth and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have snubbed us enough to attach any hope on them.


The compound mechanism of global and bi-lateral relations, as explained above, brings in light the vital question of Economic Sanctions on Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has been isolated effectively, in political terms and more so in economic fields. Thus, the imposing or lifting of Economic Sanctions by the U.S. in particular becomes a vital concern for our policy makers. The multi-dimensional repercussions, as it occurs in either situation, should become a focus of investigation.

The United States has applied economic sanctions as a "part of a coherent strategy." The U.S. has used the policy of Economic Sanctions frequently, especially after 1993. All Sanctions of this category were applied as an intentional tool of coercion and were enforced 111 times since World War I and 104 times since 1945. Since 1993 the frequency of economic coercive acts multiplied and was enforced in at least 61 instances. More than half of the economic sanctions in the last 82 years have been imposed since 1993 (in only 4 years according to June, 1998 estimates). The U.S. coercive methods to use the Economic instrument include countries like Sudan, Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Pakistan and India (1998).


The effectiveness of the economic sanctions as an instrument of policy is being debated in the United States. The intentions of the Economic Sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy are clearly spelled out by Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs while testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee. On June 03, 1998, i.e., just after the Indian nuclear test of May 11 and 13, followed by Pakistan's underground series of tests on May 28 and May 30 the Under Secretary said: "Sanctions are most effective when they have broad multinational support and participation. Multilateral sanctions maximize international pressure on the offending state. They show unity of international purpose. And because they are multilateral, these sanctions regimes are more difficult to evade or avoid…"

He went on to state that the sanctions can only be "truly effective means for influencing the policies and behavior of other countries", if they are supported at international level, especially by the industrialized economic powers. The statement implies that in the past some of the sanctioned nations have evaded these constraints by breaching the isolation circle. This became possible by a well thought comprehensive strategy, accompanied by superior diplomatic achievements, as in the case of Iran - while Pakistan was unable to perform such a feat.



One side of the argument is that by signing the CTBT, as demanded by Japan on September 6th of this year, Pakistan can avoid the snow-ball effects of international pressures; thus negating the adverse impact of the economic action. On the contrary, the negative implications of a single-item agenda remain strong, i.e., even if we abide by the demands of the CTBT as expressed by the Japanese.


After assessing Pakistan's potential dangers and dilemmas, certain policy postures are recommended with an inference that we are able to successfully deal within a highly complicated surroundings and issues.


The presumptions are that signing the CTBT alone would not release economic and political pressures on Pakistan. The United States is not going to encourage any substantial financial activity, nor will there be a regional and international acceptability. Pakistan must take further steps within a framework of a five point "package-Action", meaning that:


- It must stop close links with the Talibans and cooperate with the friendly regional states to establish a multi-national government in Kabul.

- Accept the Hurriyet Conference as the sole representatives of the Kashmiri people and support their decisions;, i.e., in stead of mulling the issue with the Indians.

- Impose Ban and take strict action against all terrorist groups in the country. The Interior Minister is on record to have said that his government is considering taking action against four terrorist gangs; while a meek and confusing action was taken against the two non-visible organisations.

- Pakistan must return to the elected Parliament and the Senate much earlier than announced. Even Pakistan's closest allies in the Muslim World are hesitant to accept the military regime. Unnecessary delays are going to pose more problems for the already distorted society. In July 2001, Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary for South Asia in the State Department, clearly said that "Section 508 of the sanctions on Pakistan could not be lifted until President Bush is able to certify that democracy is restored". She further elaborated that in this matter the U.S. President has "no waiver authority".


- All the mentioned five actions must be taken simultaneously. That will release immediate regional and international pressures and Pakistan can get sufficient space to plan its dynamic future.


AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"





FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN



November 6, 2006



Reviewer: SYED FAROOQ HASNAT


In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.


In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.


In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.


General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control.


"In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed.

General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.


SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D.
Columbia, Maryland

The Massacre at Bajaur







November 05, 2006
S. Farooq Hasnat


On October 3oth, the Pakistan army, as according to its own admission, wittingly killed scores of Pakistanis in the Khar village, located in Bajaur Agency, near the Afghan border. The army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan, gloating over the “success” claimed that in this operation gunship helicopters and precision weapons were used. Some eyewitnesses claimed that it was the American Predator Drone that fired missiles at the site, while the Pakistani official said that the Americans only provided intelligence. The Bajaur political officials barred local and representatives of foreign news agencies from entering the vicinity where this massacre took place. A noted newspaper editorial remarked that “the decision to ban journalists’ entry into the Bajaur agency is not prudent. It suggests that the government may have much to hide.”
In the first week of October, Foreign Minister Kasuri was reported to have said that Pakistan has made clear (to the U.S.) that it would not kill its own people in the tribal areas. He said that “use of military force is not the solution of problems and political matters are resolved through talks.” A CNN interview quoted his saying that “…there’s a time when not just brawn but brains are also needed,” Foreign Minister told CNN’s Late Edition. “Sometimes what happens is that when you have acts of violence you end up alienating the local population.”
The attack at Khar came as a surprise and as a tragic incident, for the people of Pakistan. The residents of Bajaur were shocked as they were gearing up for a North Waziristan type peace agreement. The signing ceremony was to take place after few hours.
It should be pointed out that the American officials have been critical of the previous peace deal between the government of Pakistan and the residents of the tribal areas, in North Waziristan. Apparently, the Bush administration demands the Pakistan government to use high handed methods against its own people. No matter, why and how it happened, there is no excuse for killing more than 80 Pakistanis. The manner in which this attack was conducted and the approach through which the government spokesmen justified it, raises lots of questions and doubts. A renowned Human Rights Organisation Amnesty International issued a statement saying that “if these killings were deliberate and took place without first attempting to arrest suspected offenders, without warning, without the suspects offering armed resistance, and in circumstances in which suspects posed no immediate risk to security forces, the killings are considered extrajudicial executions in violation of international human rights law.” There is enough evidence by the foreign and Pakistani journalists that there were children at the premises and that the air attack was more than from the Pakistani air force. As mentioned earlier just after few hours a peace treaty was going to be signed with the tribal elders, on the same pattern as that of Waziristan. Part of the North Waziristan deal read, “There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency. The writ of the state will prevail in the area”. Those who carried out December 30 Bajaur killings did so to sabotage peace in the tribal areas and as a consequence the unity of Pakistan is undermined and Army’s image is further tarnished.
Some analysts like Hassan Abbas argue that a high percentage of Pashtoon representation in the Army led to the Waziristan agreement. While others agree that in reality the Army suffered a “defeat” at the battle ground. According to government’s own admission more than 700 of its men lost their lives. The Army just fled as they have done before, in East Pakistan and Kargil. This was in spite of the fact that more than 80,000 Pakistani military troops are deployed along the tribal areas of the Afghan border. It was believed at that time that the best option for the establishment was to talk to the tribesmen through their representatives.
Another category of arguments goes that it was a pro Taliban faction with which the government entered into an agreement in Waziristan. The Taliban of the 1990s were prompted and encouraged by the Army and the tribes were made to believe that by supporting the Taliban they were helping the Pakistan Army, if not Pakistan, itself. Then, came that famous somersault in 2001. Any expert on human psychology would agree that it’s not an easy matter for the groups with conviction (instilled or otherwise) to turnaround and change their opinion, overnight. The change in attitudes comes through dialogue and persuasion. The use of force in such circumstances is counter productive and harmful for the unity and strength of the country.
There have been so many blames as well as blunders assigned to the Pakistan Army that it has become indefensible even for a relentless ally of the establishment to validate their performance. It is unfortunate that a national institution has lost its professionalism to a great extent. The obvious reason being the heavy involvement of the generals in politicking and their greed for wealth and other undue privileges (See the findings of Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report).They have too many stakes to guard – strict adherence to professionalism becomes the last option.
The crux of the matter is that one person is playing havoc with the civil, military and social institutions of Pakistan. His most serious crime in the eyes of many Pakistanis is that apart from tearing down the national institutions he is also deforming the language, culture, heritage and above all the sovereignty of Pakistan