AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"

FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN

November 6, 2006

Reviewer: Syed Farooq Hasnat

In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.

In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.

In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.

General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control. "In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed. General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D. Columbia, Maryland

PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN MURKY WATERS

Tuesday, August 02, 2005

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

In June and July the American troops and the Afghan government functionaries came under a series of armed attacks, shattering the comparative calm in Afghanistan. These vicious and daring assaults indicate that the much awaited parliamentary elections in September will not be free from trouble, and that the menace of Taliban still exists, as a potential future challenge. Contrary to what was the forecast in the past, these assaults specify that the war against terrorism in Afghanistan is far from over. The latest resistance inflicted a number of causalities on the American troops, raising the total of dead to 150, since 2001. There are nearly 15,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with an additional battalion poised for that war torn country.

The heavy reliance on the American forces indicate the lack of organised Afghan security structure, i.e., even after more than four years of the elimination of the Taliban administration and the Afghan army remains far from adequately trained. President Hamid Karzai largely depends on the US commandos for his personnel security and his opponents taunt that he is just a Mayor of Kabul, as his authority does not extend beyond that city. Although Karzai is a Pashtun but his government is dominated by much detested and suspected Uzbeks and Tajiks, minorities. Afghanistan still remains ethnically subjected as well as a competitive society with blocks of authority in various ethnic regions of the country. The law and order in Afghanistan has always been far from satisfactory and the pace of development remains extremely slow. According to an opinion, “this remained an area where, unfortunately, the Karzai government and the International Security Assistance Force have failed to deliver, as security beyond Kabul is virtually non-existent.” In particular, the Zabul Province and the adjoining areas of Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces have become strong holds of the militants. It is estimated that in these areas, the Taliban are much organised with no shortage of men, weapons and finances. The situation in Afghanistan is described by some as, “one of barely managed chaos”.

Before the attacks, it was estimated by the US sources and the Afghan government that insurgency had faded away and that the Taliban had lost their clout in the country. The main reason given was that last October, Presidential elections took place without hindrance and that during the winter of 2004-5, there was little or no activity from the Taliban. However, since April of this year 45 US military personnel were killed by the suspected Taliban, while hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians died in armed clashes. It was said that the Afghan militants were using the same tactics of attack as the Iraqi insurgents. These activities panicked the fragile Afghan government, as well it exposed its vulnerability.

Accompanied by the hype in militancy, came a volley of direct and indirect blames on Pakistan. Included, in that rhetoric was the statement of Afghan-American US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad. He vehemently said that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were somewhere in Pakistan. He however, could not substantiate his allegations with details and evidence. His claim that the militants have infiltrated from Pakistan, in an organised manner, was termed as baseless and irresponsible by Pakistan. Ambassador Khalizad’s charge was followed by statements by the Afghan government officials, the official controlled news media and President Karzai, himself. In Pakistan the reaction was sharp and forthcoming. Apart from a strong statement from government representative, terming these charges as irresponsible and without evidence, the un-official electronic and print media started to question the rationale of Pakistan’s complete commitment towards war against terrorism, in this part of the world. One of the leading Pakistani daily remarked, “It’s time Pakistan should rethink its policy of cooperating in the War on Terror and being rewarded only with slurs”.

The present crisis was defused with the intervention of President Bush, who persuaded both the countries to focus more on war against terrorism, than finding faults with each other. These developments further confirmed that bilateral ties between the two neighboring countries have become a matter of triangular relations, aggravating with the spread of global terrorism – becoming more problematic. Pak-Afghan relations remain a matter of serious concern for the US strategic planners, as long as militancy continues to dominate the region.

Pakistan maintains around 80,000 troops in the tribal and adjoining areas, with Afghanistan. The borders are completely sealed, with latest reconnaissance devices and the Taliban entering Afghanistan in an organised manner is inconceivable. The main weakness lies with the Afghan security apparatus itself. A glaring example is the escape of four Afghan prisoners from Bagram jail, a facility that is heavily guarded and is under the direct control of the American troops. The escape was not possible without the cooperation of the Afghan soldiers, on duty. Till now there has been no trace of the escapees, who were known for their hardened ideology and considered extremely dangerous. It is easier for the Afghan administration to blame Pakistan for their security lapses, as little efforts are made by Kabul administration to establish its control in areas that are beyond the city of Kabul. Apart from that the Pashtun population is kept alienated by the Tajik-Uzbak alliance in the government. All Taliban might be Pashtuns but all Pashtuns does not confer to the ideology of the Taliban. In the close knit tribal society of Afghanistan, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two. Sometimes it is deliberately done so, to keep the majority of the Pashtuns, who are more than 50 percent of the Afghan population, away from the mainstream politics.

Since the 1980s, Afghanistan is coupled with Pakistan in a number of ways. The basis being that no matter what happens in Afghanistan it has direct fallout on the Pakistani society, whether as a result of regional compulsions or so chosen by the Pakistani establishment. The flurry of attacks on the Afghan government troops and the American military deployments during these months raised many new questions. These were not only in regard to Afghanistan’s internal security but also relates to the fragile relations between the two neighboring countries. At least, as a part of a policy pronouncement, Kabul recognises that its security is closely allied with that of Pakistan. On the eve of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s one day official visit to Kabul on July 24, these sentiments were reflected in Afghan Foreign Ministry statement saying that “friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were in the national interest of both countries and an essential component to promote stability in the region”. On several occasions, similar statements have also been made in the past. But, when pressures increases, the level of relations between the two countries come back to a naught.

The Afghan government continues to suspect Pakistan for being supportive of the militants in their country and in the present circumstances, there is little chance that Kabul could be convinced otherwise. The focal point of these relations remains around the conflict between Taliban and the Afghan security setup. Pakistan is dragged in the Afghan quandary, when it fails to manage the operations of Afghan related militant groups in its own society. Therefore, when it comes to Afghan militancy, the part of the problem comes from within Pakistan. Musharraf’s government is seen by many as ineffective. The General’s July 21 address to the nation vowed to eradicate militancy in Pakistan, but is regarded by observers as nothing more than his January 12, 2002 declaration to take charge of extremism and militancy in the country. The present “awakening” of Musharraf is attributed to July 7 London bombings, in which the suicide bombers were alleged to have visited a Pakistani madrassa.

On its part, the Afghan society always presents itself in a package, carrying with itself a variety of dynamics and variables, which most of the time is difficult to manage by normal means. The past experience shows that the Afghans have yet to learn, solving their conflicts and accommodating the other point of view while running the government affairs. They have no experience in the modern concepts of legislative bodies, political parties or a structured judicial system. Whatever little they have, is confined to Kabul. In sum, there does not exist a political culture on whose foundations a modern society could be constructed. More so, with the brain drain since 1979, that went on unabated, the Afghan society lacks an indigenous expertise to manage their country. Experience has proved that a divided Afghanistan, devoid of any functional institutions, is incapable of reaching any political solution. As a reaction, the Kabul administration starts looking for a scapegoat and Pakistan is invariably there to be singled out.

There is little hope that the forthcoming September parliamentary elections would provide a substantial betterment of the overall situation. Pakistan would continue to receive the fallout of the Afghan mismanagement, unless the government takes immediate strict measures to eradicate the Afghan linked militants. The noted aspect is that Pakistan has lost its creditability to perform any meaningful role in the divided and volatile Afghan society. Because of intense past interference in the Afghan factional conflict, Pakistan has conceded most of its neutral ground and is branded as an active partner in the existing militancy. In fact the Pakistani establishment is visualised as a major part of the problem. This view is also shared by some American officials, who regard Musharraf not doing enough to stop the recruitment of the Taliban cadres. After all, Ambassador Khalizad is nothing more than a mouthpiece of the Bush administration.

In the circumstances, it is required that Pakistan makes drastic adjustments in its Afghan related attitudes and put its own house in order. That would provide an opportunity to depart from its defective perceptions of the past and set the record straight. Pakistan has got another chance to amend its follies. It still has an opportunity to exit from the “Afghan muddle” that it had partly created for itself.

A New Meaning of Conflicts: Some Lessons for Pakistan

Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat
Adjunct Scholar
Middle East Institute
Washington, D.C


Increasingly, the perceptions and rules governing post Second World War conflicts, border wars and even total wars have changed. In various situations the era of standing armies and the might of armament have become less relevant. The theorists and futurists of conflict can no longer rely on a raw data of the armed forces as well the destructive capacity of an armament. There are many more factors that must be scrutinized before we can come to an objective prediction. The tactics have changed and so has the focus of a war theater. Urban guerilla combat, hit and run, suicide bombing and more so the battles being fought in front of cameras, with night vision technology are the hard realities that is and will be considered in the future. Furthermore, it has been observed that low intensity conflicts take a heavy toll on the developed economies. Apart from the tactics, the ideological nature of global conflicts, particularly in the Middle East has received a new meaning. The Muslims see the support for westernization of their societies as a reminder of the European colonial onslaught through their “civilizing mission”. They perceive the agenda of “Enlightened Moderation” nothing but a foreign instrument of dominance, especially when the political institutions are made exception to this rule. The West, in turn sees the Muslim agitation as a threat to their “civilization” and “way of living”, as repeatedly presented by the Western politicians and media. In short, the rules of the game have changed.

The United States in Vietnam and again in Iraq, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Israel in Lebanon wrestled against much smaller and weak opponents but were unable to pacify their adversaries. This was in spite of the fact that there was no match between the belligerents, in terms of military equipment and usage of defence technology. In such endeavors these otherwise powerful nations also loose their credibility of being invincible. Who could image that Israel would be subdued, when in the past they were able to rout the combined armies of the Arab countries, in just six days. Surely, these setbacks have reduced the capacity of global and regional powers to take or influence any similar endeavors, in the future. The United Sates found itself completely incapacitated in the Lebanon crises and the lingering Palestinian issue, mainly because of its being bogged down in Iraq. In all these situations it is the stronger power that suffered ultimate defeat in a sense that it failed to achieve its goals for which aggression was launched. On the other hand, though weak entities suffered tremendous human loss and misery, but it is the ultimate that counts.

In three out of the four mentioned conflicts the tactics of widespread suicide bombing was and is being used only in Iraq. There is some exception in another war theater in Afghanistan where the conflict still goes on and therefore a final assessment has still to come. The suicide tactics, though deplorable is erroneously being seen by the West as a part of a Muslim ideology and religion. The reality is that basically suicide bombings are a European invention by an anarchist, Joseph Conrad, who introduced it in his novel “Secret Agent” (1907). The concept was used as a battle tactic, by Japanese Kamikaze, during the Second World War and there were some instances from the Germans, as well. Later on, the Tamil Tigers used this method against the government of Sri Lanka. As we understand today, it is primarily a tool of stateless groups, who are otherwise out numbered and outgunned by their adversaries.

The United States under President Bush sees global conflicts in a changed perspective. Well know Bush doctrine points out towards a notion of a “preemptive strike”, meaning that a country can be attacked and even destroyed, if there is a suspicion that in the future it can pose a threat to the American interests. Using the pretext of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction Iraq was attacked in March-April, 2003. Even when it came to be known that there were no weapons of such kind, nor Saddam had any links with al-Qaeda, the justification to continue the conflict got another names like “regime change” and “establishing a democratic system”. The conventional wisdom as established by the U.N. charter is that a country cannot resort to war unless attacked, in actual terms and its national sovereignty threatened.

In another war theater, the Israelis knew no limits when under the pretext of freeing two of its solders devastated Lebanon and killed more than 500 children and an equal number of innocent women. Both these conflicts took a heavy toll on human lives, as thousands were displaced and their homes destroyed. It is estimated that in Iraq more than half a million Iraqi civilians have lost their lives with many more injured, while in Lebanon more than 1000 died in just 30 days of relentless aerial bombing. In spite of all the killings and destruction, both the United States and Israel remained far from victory. The stubbornness and reliance of the small groups send a message that future conflicts and wars will be of different nature – where huge armies, armament and advanced military technology will take a back seat.

MIT professor Noam Chomsky and co-author Professor Gilbert Achcar points towards the new implications of inter-state conflicts in their recent book, “Perilous Power:” The authors observe that first; religion is being used in the recent conflicts, as a vehicle for political and economic interests. Secondly, fundamentalism is not confined to the Muslim combatant groups, alone. It is also very much “a powerful Christian strain as it exists in the US that has enormous influence over right wing Republican-led governments.” The authors acknowledge that fundamentalism has become a global affair, spread over nearly all societies around the globe – a phenomenon that came into focus just over the last two decades. This view is supplemented by Reza Aslan in his book “There is no god but God”. He cites one of many examples where the global conflicts are seen by the fundamentalists, in the West, as between good and evil. He writes, “When the Republican senator from Oklahoma, James Inhofe, stands before the U.S. Congress and insists that the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are not political or territorial battles but ‘a contest over whether or not the word of God is true,’ he speaks, knowingly or not, the language of the Crusades.”

The changed perspective of conflicts requires that nations like Pakistan with huge defence budget and top-heavy army should reconsider their security options. As the examples of Iraq and Lebanon shows the new wars can be fought successfully, without the shining insignias of the elite class. Genuine requisites to protect a nation include the strength of people through their well build civil institutions as well as the requirement of the involvement by the people in the decision making process.

The mystery of Pak-Iran ties

Monday, December 4, 2006

By Dr Syed Farooq Hasnat

While talking to the Iranian media delegation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said on November 6, that his country supports Iran to acquire nuclear technology and that Pakistan desires to develop its relations with Iran, still further. The Prime Minister elaborated that Pakistan was serious in the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project as it would strengthen trade between the two countries. Repeating the rhetoric in the same tone Foreign Minister Kasuri assured the Iranian delegation that Pakistan opposes the American use of force against the Iranian nuclear sites. On another occasion Mr Aziz said, “we think Iran should not proliferate. We’re against production of any nuclear weapons in the region. We think Iran does have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards and guidelines.”

It goes without saying that neither the PM nor his Foreign Minister design Pakistan’s domestic or foreign policy. The fixation of the establishment with a single power has paralysed the policy makers to consider the future developments that would emerge after the international war against terrorism concludes or subsides. There is no blueprint for days when Pakistan will struggle for partners and reliance, as prevalent high dependency policy, projected and perused zealously, would whither away, as it would not find any partners. When it comes to Pakistan-Iran relations there is much more than what actually is being said by the establishment or its proxies. It is this aspect which worries a common Pakistani who would like to see Pakistan as a sovereign and viable state, free to choose its friends and allies in a long term perspective. It is being felt that a traditional high priority that every government attached to its relations with Iran is no more there. The closeness of the two countries is reflected well by President Ayub Khan, who said while addressing the Iranian Senate in 1959 that, “Our two nations are no strangers to each other, our friendship is nothing new… Your classics are our classics. Your heroes are our heroes. It is not only through a common culture and religious heritage that our nations are linked together—historically we have been one nation in the past, geographically we have a common border and ethnologically we are of the same stock.”

The point of departure from what was said in the late 1950s comes when the present establishment does not posses enough sensitivity and sophistication to understand the realities of closeness between the two countries. The lowest ebb of relations between the two countries came when in mid-1990s the Pakistani establishment developed close ties with the Taliban and openly supported them in their battles against the Iran backed Northern Alliance. The darkest moment came when nine Iranian diplomats were killed by the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998. Iranians accused Pakistan of not doing enough to stop the murder of their diplomats, although assurances ware given by the Pakistani government for the safety of the diplomats. A crises situation arose in the region when 200,000 Iranian troops massed on the Afghan border supported by amour, helicopters and other war related logistics were put in place. Although an armed clash was avoided, it left yet another blotch on the weakling Pakistan-Iran relations.

Before the Taliban became Pakistan’s obsession and consequentially an icon of the flawed policy, Pakistan maintained more than cordial relations with Iran. As mentioned above, Iran was regarded as closest to Pakistan’s history, culture, language, and heritage and security interests, along with Turkey. People of Pakistan still recall the 14 September 1965 visit of the Iranian Prime Minister to Rawalpindi, along with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He carried a message of support from the Iranian government, for Pakistan’s conflict with India.Iran co-ordinated its policies with Pakistan, opposing the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a visible tilt towards Iran in its war against Iraq. Both the countries are partners in an economic regional organisation, Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), a forerunner of Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), which was established in 1964 along with Turkey. Within the regional organisational framework both countries vow to continue to co-operate with each other on various matters of mutual interest, but there is hardly a substantial dividend on the ground. Both the countries have signed scores of MoUs and agreements but very little have come out in a concrete manner. Even the well-projected and well-advertised gas pipeline is under jeopardy. The trade volume between the two neighbouring countries remains disappointingly low and no serious parameters are set to correct this deficiency.

Despite of difference of policies between Pakistan and Iran on the Taliban issue, after 2002 both the countries struggled to maintain good workable relations. There are stronger extractions that do not allow these countries to harmonise with each other. There is hardly a high level contact between the two countries or a strong desire to improvise methods for closer ties. General Musharraf has not visited Iran since 1999 and so has any Iranian high official after President Mohammad Khatami’s visit in December 2002. There seems to be a detracting pull that is tearing both the countries apart from each other. A number of analysts are of the view that there is a powerful lobby in Islamabad which has succeeded in keeping Pakistan away from Iran and they believe that it is the same lobby which is creating hindrances in the gas pipeline and other co-operative measures between the two neighbours.

It is a wrong assumption to believe that Iran’s closer ties with India is a factor in distancing of relations between Iran and Pakistan. First, Pakistan itself for obvious reasons is going out of its way to normalise relations with India, even making adjustments in its principled position. Secondly, Indian stance in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran’s nuclear programme has further proved that this premise is not correct. There are other reasons that become a hindrance between the two countries to normalise their relations.

The confined people of Pakistan are mere spectators in this big puzzle. The clueless masses just ponder that who allowed these precious links to wither away and what kind of self-interests are responsible for inflicting this damage to the Pakistani vital objectives and above all who has taken away all the warmth for the Iranian people.

email: hasnatf1@yahoo.com