Musharraf: Struggling for legitimacy

WEEKLY INDEPENDENT

Issue 49 Volume 04, May 26 - June 01, 2005

There seems to be no end to Musharraf's controversial rule. His appetite for power remains unlimited and his desire to flout the democratic traditions has no confines

Syed Farooq Hasnat

On May 18, 2005 the Pakistani official spokesman said that General Pervez Musharraf would continue to hold office beyond 2007. With this statement there seems to be no end to Musharraf's controversial rule. His appetite for power remains unlimited and his desire to flout the democratic traditions of Pakistan has no confines. His only rationale to be in power is his self-proclaimed indispensability against international terrorism. He sends the message that the forces of extremism would take over Pakistan, more so its nuclear assets, once he is out of power. In fact it's just the opposite, as illegal control would in fact encourage militancy in Pakistan. It would undermine the genuine national political parties and would inculcate a culture of distrust and greed. All these factors taken together would further weaken not strengthen the Pakistani society.

As witnessed in Afghanistan, unstable societies are a hotbed for extremist tendencies. The new world order presented a value system, according to which the human rights and democratic institutions were to be encouraged and enforced.

By the end of the last century it became unthinkable that in countries where democratic institutions were in place could follow any other path. The emphasis was on the strengthening of the institutions; its rollback was not conceived. On 12th October 1999, Pakistan became an exception when its military took over power, sacked the elected Prime Minister (no matter how controversial he was), dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies and suspended the constitution. This was the fourth time that the army had intervened, through martial law, although this time it was not declared as such. The promised takings of the post-coup regime were stereotypes, such as a promise of free and fair elections, bringing true democracy in the country and eradication of corruption. It was an echo of the previous military dictatorships of General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan and General Ziaul Haq.

Soon after his takeover, addressing a press conference, General Musharraf affirmed that he would remain in office for not more than three years. Since 1958, the direct military rule in Pakistan is spread for about three decades. From 1985 to 1988 General Ziaul Haq installed a civilian Prime Minister, but kept the powers in his office, by grossly amending the 1973 Constitution. After the death of General Zia, a political process started as a result of 1988 elections, with an expectation that future Pakistan would move towards a civil society. For nearly 11 years (1988-1999) Pakistan Muslim League, under Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto alternately shared power. Within the mainstream politics, for the first time, a two party system emerged, promising that it would provide a kind of political stability that was not seen before - although, both the leaders could not use their authority to strengthen the institutions, political or otherwise. These governments lacked seriousness of purpose and agendas for the future. Their commitment to the welfare of the people was weak and the matters that affected the real lives of the people were never addressed. Whenever the opportunity arose, these two leaders would jump to cooperate with the military establishment. In fact, when in opposition they would send feelers to the Commander-in-Chief to intervene. The civilian governments failed to allow a democratic culture to take its roots in the polity of Pakistan.

However, in spite of all its flaws, the political process was captivating the foundations of a democratic culture. More so, the participation of the people was being reflected, in one way or the other. It was believed that uninterrupted political process would ultimately bring a civil society in place and that Pakistan would get rid of the menace of military takeovers. The frail political governments were not all that meek. The military interference was challenged from time to time and measures were taken to take command of the armed forces. One of the fragile Prime Ministers, Muhammad Khan Junejo, boldly challenged the corruption and non-professionalism within the armed forces. Just before his ouster, apart from other acts to curtail the ambitious generals, he had ordered an inquiry into the Ojheri weaponry site blast of April 10, 1988, which was suspected to be masterminded by an army general. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 8, 1998 removed the Amy Chief General Jehangir Karamat for his interference in politics and a naval chief was dismissed on corruption charges. No matter Nawaz Sharif wanted to clip the wings of the Generals to enhance his personal power, but these actions fit well in explaining a delicate balance between the military and the civilian authority - where ultimately the civilian governments lost the battle for control.On its part, the military sat on the fences, putting pressures on at least three main concerns of Pakistan, namely the nuclear issue, the Kashmir issue and the Afghanistan issue. The military pushed the weak political governments to accommodate the retired Generals at key civilian positions, severely compromising the efficiency of the national institutions. Apart from that the military got increasingly involved in taking control of the economic institutions of the country, their corporate interests got more expanded with every new opportunity. With that the stories of corruption and nepotism became a household talk.

Immediately after the coup, Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf held a one-and-a-half-hour meeting with the Ambassador of the United States, William B. Milam, which, according to some sources, was described as 'good'. It was quoted that the American Ambassador gave a patient hearing to the military ruler and, heard with interest his agenda to solve Pakistan's unresolved issues. It was known that General Pervez Musharraf wanted to get a nod from the United States, which was the sole super power, with ability to influence the world/regional events. General Musharraf's legitimacy as a military ruler, could not come from the people of Pakistan and he understood that well.

Anxious as he was, the General was desperate to legitimise his rule by whatever means. Like his predecessor General Ziaul Haq, General Musharraf in 2002 undertook to legitimise his rule by holding a national referendum. Like General Zia, the system could not gain legitimacy by the law of necessity doctrine alone, so generously applied by the highest court in Pakistan. The referendum question was: "For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of Quaid-e-Azam, would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as President of Pakistan for five years?" A number of people reportedly cared to vote but the General declared himself as the President for the next five years. Interestingly, later the General admitted that the referendum was flawed but he would still keep his post for the next five years. The Washington Post in its editorial of April 12, 2002 had suggested that the Bush administration's support for the General in holding a referendum would be a mistake, unless he is willing to "work within a legitimate democratic system". But political expediency overcame all other values. Even today, the question of legitimacy is grave for the President. In spite of the inherent flaws in the procedure, at the eve of that legitimising exercise, a number of questions were raised. It was argued that, "the referendum results could be termed authentic only if the next elected parliament and the provincial assemblies validate them. Secondly, the President must not amend the constitution unnecessarily. Thirdly, the newly elected President must not manipulate the forthcoming general elections. Fourthly, once his election is validated by the newly-elected legislatures, General Musharraf should retire as the Chief of Army Staff." On all accounts, the General failed to fulfill any of the conditions and thus even after three years, questions about his legitimacy as a head of the State and government remain on the horizon.By the first quarter of 2005, the Pakistani society had become a hallmark of misrule, as widespread corruption and mediocre became the standard norm.

At the macro level the issues of the legitimacy of the regime and sovereignty of the nation remains the two main concerns for the people of Pakistan. A unanimous view exists that under the repeated military interventions, the Pakistani society has grossly worsened and help is needed in all fields. A renowned Pakistani Professor noted that the national "politics has been reduced to a mere game of chess and with the exception of rare voices in the wilderness, transcendental principles have no relevance in statecraft". He further adds "…for all the claims of realism and pragmatism, the problems of an economy in shambles, law and order in disarray and education in tatters, and not addressed. Politics has fallen into disrepute because the practitioners of realpolitik do not appear to have a clear vision of the chronic ills of our society. In the realm of thought, we are going in the dark".

The Pakistani society today is a sad picture of the collapse of all institutions and a widespread degeneration in the society. People have been led to shortcuts, greed, and other illegal means, thus paving ways for incompetence and corruption. Nearly every programme that was launched by the military government, failed to achieve its goals, education being the major victim.Pakistan represents more of a society resembling a medieval rule, with a resemblance of the dark ages of the Muslim civilisation, than a modern Islamic nation with well-established structures of a civil society. Professor Stephen Cohen remarks, "If he (General Musharraf) resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yahya Khan - also a well-intentioned general who did the United States a great service". The professor further hinted that Musharraf has rented his country to the more powerful states. General Musharraf gets his legitimacy from outside as he fails to get from the people of Pakistan.

The writer is former Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science, Punjab University. He settled in the US after serving the Punjab University for 28 years. He is Adjunct Scholar at Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

Email: Hasnatf1@yahoo.com

Pakistan President Released Al Qaeda Suspects

The New York Sun

September 22, 2006 Edition

BY ELI LAKE - Staff Reporter of the SunSeptember 22, 2006

URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/40183



WASHINGTON — When Pakistan's president arrives here on Friday, he will be grilled about his decision this month to release more than 1,000 prisoners, some of whom are suspected to be high-value Al Qaeda operatives.

The problem for the White House is that America does not know which prisoners were released as part of a ceasefire agreement the Pakistani military signed with tribal leaders in the border province of Waziristan. Pakistani officials have yet to share the names with their American counterparts, according to an intelligence official and an administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The officials said one of the White House's top goals for the meeting between President Musharraf and President Bush is to persuade the Pakistani leader to give up the dossier on the prisoners. While Bush administration officials have publicly praised the agreement — whereby 80,000 Pakistani soldiers will remain in Waziristan but will not conduct house-to-house raids or other intrusive patrols — privately it is viewed with more suspicion. In the last week, scant details of those released from the Pakistani prisons have surfaced in the local press in Waziristan, as well as in the London DailyTelegraph.

Pakistani officials have downplayed the prisoner release. In a story on the UPI news wire this week, a spokesman for Mr. Musharraf said that only a few dozen local fighters were released.
But Langley and the Pentagon do not share this view, the intelligence official told The New York Sun yesterday. "Frankly, we are very worried about this," he said. "We can't get straight answers on who was released."

The administration official said, "We know they are releasing some individuals. The $64,000 question is: Who are they?"

Two names that have surfaced in the Pakistani press are Ghulam Mustapha, a man American intelligence considers to be a top fixer for Pakistan's jihadist community, and Fazl Raziq, a Pakistani national thought to be a top aide to Osama bin Laden. Many analysts here believe Mr. bin Laden is hiding in Waziristan.

One concern for the intelligence community is whether Omar Sayed Sheikh was among the released prisoners. "I have been asking about this for a week now," the intelligence official said of Mr. Sheikh, who is one of the men alleged to have killed a Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, in 2002. "I am not getting any straight answers.

The atmosphere surrounding Mr. Musharraf's visit is already strained. On Wednesday, Mr. Bush told CNN that he would send American troops to Pakistan if he thought he could capture Mr. bin Laden. Mr. Musharraf countered yesterday that his country would never accept foreign soldiers on its soil. That point was underscored when the body of an Afghan national, Wazir Khan, was found in the main town of Waziristan, Mirin Shah, yesterday with a note attached that read in part: "See the body of this man who was spying for America. Anyone doing such a thing will face the same fate," according to the Associated Press.

Despite the tension leading up to the meeting, the White House yesterday played up the get-together as a routine parley between two allies in the war on terror. A White House spokeswoman, Dana Perino, told reporters: "As we've said before, Pakistan is an important partner in the war on terror and a friend to the United States.We've had excellent cooperation in many areas, including counterterrorism. And the president has repeatedly said how much he appreciates Musharraf's commitment to pursuing Al Qaeda and continuing to work with us in cooperation in the search for Osama bin Laden. Pakistan and the United States remain close allies, working not only on the war on terror together, but on many other areas."

An analyst at the Middle East Institute, Syed Hasnat, said Mr. Musharraf had to sign the deal with the Waziri tribal leaders because the military occupation was not working.

"The Pakistani government asked the tribal leaders to hand over Al Qaeda to them. Many of them though had nothing to do with insurgency. This agreement was signed for peace and tranquility," he said. "The Pakistani army failed to take control of the region militarily."

Mr. Musharraf will be in America until next week. He is scheduled to meet with Mr. Bush and President Karzai of Afghanistan on Tuesday.

September 22, 2006 Edition > Section: Foreign > Printer-Friendly Version

Pakistan-Afghan Relations in Murky Waters

2 August, 2005

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

In June and July the American troops and the Afghan government functionaries came under a series of armed attacks, shattering the comparative calm in Afghanistan. These vicious and daring assaults indicate that the much awaited parliamentary elections in September will not be free from trouble, and that the menace of Taliban still exists, as a potential future challenge. Contrary to what was the forecast in the past, these assaults specify that the war against terrorism in Afghanistan is far from over. The latest resistance inflicted a number of causalities on the American troops, raising the total of dead to 150, since 2001. There are nearly 15,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with an additional battalion poised for that war torn country. The heavy reliance on the American forces indicate the lack of organised Afghan security structure, i.e., even after more than four years of the elimination of the Taliban administration and the Afghan army remains far from adequately trained. President Hamid Karzai largely depends on the US commandos for his personnel security and his opponents taunt that he is just a Mayor of Kabul, as his authority does not extend beyond that city. Although Karzai is a Pashtun but his government is dominated by much detested and suspected Uzbeks and Tajiks, minorities. Afghanistan still remains ethnically subjected as well as a competitive society with blocks of authority in various ethnic regions of the country.

The law and order in Afghanistan has always been far from satisfactory and the pace of development remains extremely slow. According to an opinion, “this remained an area where, unfortunately, the Karzai government and the International Security Assistance Force have failed to deliver, as security beyond Kabul is virtually non-existent.” In particular, the Zabul Province and the adjoining areas of Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces have become strong holds of the militants. It is estimated that in these areas, the Taliban are much organised with no shortage of men, weapons and finances. The situation in Afghanistan is described by some as, “one of barely managed chaos”.Before the attacks, it was estimated by the US sources and the Afghan government that insurgency had faded away and that the Taliban had lost their clout in the country. The main reason given was that last October, Presidential elections took place without hindrance and that during the winter of 2004-5, there was little or no activity from the Taliban. However, since April of this year 45 US military personnel were killed by the suspected Taliban, while hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians died in armed clashes. It was said that the Afghan militants were using the same tactics of attack as the Iraqi insurgents. These activities panicked the fragile Afghan government, as well it exposed its vulnerability.Accompanied by the hype in militancy, came a volley of direct and indirect blames on Pakistan. Included, in that rhetoric was the statement of Afghan-American US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad. He vehemently said that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were somewhere in Pakistan. He however, could not substantiate his allegations with details and evidence. His claim that the militants have infiltrated from Pakistan, in an organised manner, was termed as baseless and irresponsible by Pakistan. Ambassador Khalizad’s charge was followed by statements by the Afghan government officials, the official controlled news media and President Karzai, himself. In Pakistan the reaction was sharp and forthcoming.

Apart from a strong statement from government representative, terming these charges as irresponsible and without evidence, the un-official electronic and print media started to question the rationale of Pakistan’s complete commitment towards war against terrorism, in this part of the world. One of the leading Pakistani daily remarked, “It’s time Pakistan should rethink its policy of cooperating in the War on Terror and being rewarded only with slurs”.The present crisis was defused with the intervention of President Bush, who persuaded both the countries to focus more on war against terrorism, than finding faults with each other. These developments further confirmed that bilateral ties between the two neighboring countries have become a matter of triangular relations, aggravating with the spread of global terrorism – becoming more problematic. Pak-Afghan relations remain a matter of serious concern for the US strategic planners, as long as militancy continues to dominate the region. Pakistan maintains around 80,000 troops in the tribal and adjoining areas, with Afghanistan. The borders are completely sealed, with latest reconnaissance devices and the Taliban entering Afghanistan in an organised manner is inconceivable.

The main weakness lies with the Afghan security apparatus itself. A glaring example is the escape of four Afghan prisoners from Bagram jail, a facility that is heavily guarded and is under the direct control of the American troops. The escape was not possible without the cooperation of the Afghan soldiers, on duty. Till now there has been no trace of the escapees, who were known for their hardened ideology and considered extremely dangerous. It is easier for the Afghan administration to blame Pakistan for their security lapses, as little efforts are made by Kabul administration to establish its control in areas that are beyond the city of Kabul. Apart from that the Pashtun population is kept alienated by the Tajik-Uzbak alliance in the government. All Taliban might be Pashtuns but all Pashtuns does not confer to the ideology of the Taliban. In the close knit tribal society of Afghanistan, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two. Sometimes it is deliberately done so, to keep the majority of the Pashtuns, who are more than 50 percent of the Afghan population, away from the mainstream politics.Since the 1980s, Afghanistan is coupled with Pakistan in a number of ways. The basis being that no matter what happens in Afghanistan it has direct fallout on the Pakistani society, whether as a result of regional compulsions or so chosen by the Pakistani establishment.

The flurry of attacks on the Afghan government troops and the American military deployments during these months raised many new questions. These were not only in regard to Afghanistan’s internal security but also relates to the fragile relations between the two neighboring countries. At least, as a part of a policy pronouncement, Kabul recognises that its security is closely allied with that of Pakistan. On the eve of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s one day official visit to Kabul on July 24, these sentiments were reflected in Afghan Foreign Ministry statement saying that “friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were in the national interest of both countries and an essential component to promote stability in the region”. On several occasions, similar statements have also been made in the past. But, when pressures increases, the level of relations between the two countries come back to a naught.The Afghan government continues to suspect Pakistan for being supportive of the militants in their country and in the present circumstances, there is little chance that Kabul could be convinced otherwise.

The focal point of these relations remains around the conflict between Taliban and the Afghan security setup. Pakistan is dragged in the Afghan quandary, when it fails to manage the operations of Afghan related militant groups in its own society. Therefore, when it comes to Afghan militancy, the part of the problem comes from within Pakistan. Musharraf’s government is seen by many as ineffective. The General’s July 21 address to the nation vowed to eradicate militancy in Pakistan, but is regarded by observers as nothing more than his January 12, 2002 declaration to take charge of extremism and militancy in the country. The present “awakening” of Musharraf is attributed to July 7 London bombings, in which the suicide bombers were alleged to have visited a Pakistani madrassa. On its part, the Afghan society always presents itself in a package, carrying with itself a variety of dynamics and variables, which most of the time is difficult to manage by normal means.

The past experience shows that the Afghans have yet to learn, solving their conflicts and accommodating the other point of view while running the government affairs. They have no experience in the modern concepts of legislative bodies, political parties or a structured judicial system. Whatever little they have, is confined to Kabul. In sum, there does not exist a political culture on whose foundations a modern society could be constructed. More so, with the brain drain since 1979, that went on unabated, the Afghan society lacks an indigenous expertise to manage their country. Experience has proved that a divided Afghanistan, devoid of any functional institutions, is incapable of reaching any political solution. As a reaction, the Kabul administration starts looking for a scapegoat and Pakistan is invariably there to be singled out. There is little hope that the forthcoming September parliamentary elections would provide a substantial betterment of the overall situation. Pakistan would continue to receive the fallout of the Afghan mismanagement, unless the government takes immediate strict measures to eradicate the Afghan linked militants. The noted aspect is that Pakistan has lost its creditability to perform any meaningful role in the divided and volatile Afghan society. Because of intense past interference in the Afghan factional conflict, Pakistan has conceded most of its neutral ground and is branded as an active partner in the existing militancy.

In fact the Pakistani establishment is visualised as a major part of the problem. This view is also shared by some American officials, who regard Musharraf not doing enough to stop the recruitment of the Taliban cadres. After all, Ambassador Khalizad is nothing more than a mouthpiece of the Bush administration. In the circumstances, it is required that Pakistan makes drastic adjustments in its Afghan related attitudes and put its own house in order. That would provide an opportunity to depart from its defective perceptions of the past and set the record straight. Pakistan has got another chance to amend its follies. It still has an opportunity to exit from the “Afghan muddle” that it had partly created for itself.

A Changed Landscape of Kashmir Conflict

Weekly Independent

Sunday July 17th, 2005

by S. Farooq Hasnat

For more than one and a half years, General Musharraf has been bending backwards to accommodate the Indian leaders. His declared intention is to resolve the main dispute of Kashmir, during his tenure in office. On one occasion he said that the dispute can be resolved in two weeks. To engage the Indian leadership, he took a number of steps, including self inviting himself to Delhi and to let loose control over travel between the peoples of two Kashmirs. Along with that, meetings between the officials of the two countries were initiated to look into Siachen Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Baglihar dam and others disputes.

The critics of Musharraf’s policy of reconciliation towards India argue that although he presented many concessions, one after another, he got little in return. It is further said that in real terms, a tacit understanding with India has been undertaken that the Line of Control (LoC) will be converted into an international border between the two countries. The General refutes these allegations and says that his proposals do not negate the principled stance of Pakistan. As a result of these developments, the tensions between the two countries eased out, but so far no substantial progress has been made, either on “minor” issues or on Kashmir itself. However, the single most significant headway was the two-week long visit of the nine Kashmiri leaders, of which five were from the “moderate” wing of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The snag of the visit was the absence of Syed Ali Geelani, leader of his own faction of the Hurriyat. He declined the Pakistani invitation by saying that he had decided to present his “resentment” of what he called Pakistan government’s “deviation from its stand on Kashmir”. He further said that India has not shifted from its standpoint on Kashmir and he was not sure that what he will bring back from the Pakistan visit. It was felt in Pakistan that Geelani’s decision had dampened the initiative to start a dialogue with the Kashmri leaders in held Kashmir. After all, Syed Ali Geelani was the one who once called himself “a proud Pakistani”. Another key Kashmiri, Shabir Shah wrote, “Kashmiri” in the Indian passport application’s citizenship column, and was refused the passport.

The Hurriyat leaders’ visit to Pakistan changed the whole landscape of the Kashmir dispute, when they clearly made home heir point that any future solution of the Kashmir issue must be initiated by the Kashmiris, themselves. They further said that they would not accept, as has been a practice in the past, that Kashmir be conferred as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India. Hurriyat’s key spokesman and Held Kashmir’s spiritual leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq even denied the relevancy of the 1948 resolutions, of the United Nations Security Council. These utterances made irrelevant the long drawn position of Pakistan, for which it worked hard for five decades. Mirwaiz, on his return to Srinagar, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times, saying that it will not be acceptable to split Kashmir on the basis of “religion, ethnic or regional divisions”. He further wrote that his group intends to continue a dialogue with Pakistan as well as the Indian leadership, on separate tracks. According to him, “this will give Kashmiris a sense of genuine involvement, a must for any progress towards resolution”. Mirwaiz made it clear that attempts to converge the LoC into a permanent international boundary would be a reprehensible action.

These remarks by the Kashmiri leaders sent ripples across the relevant circles in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. There is no doubt that one main fallout of the Hurriyat visit is that the initiate has been taken away from Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves have taken the drivers seat. While addressing thousands of Kashmiris, at the mosque in Srinagar, after his return from landmark 14 days visit to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, Mirwaiz declared that General Musharraf told him that “any solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir will be acceptable to Pakistan," This is not what the Pakistani military leadership had expected. After all it marginalized Pakistan’s position and the circumstances are moving fast towards the conception of an independent Kashmir. Another aspect to be considered is that whether the gestures by the Indian government are to defuse as well confuse the issue or are serious attempts to sole the dispute, as according to the desires of the Kashmiri people. Representing this view point, a noted Lahore daily, The Nation wrote in its editorial of June 22, that “the whole idea behind the façade of Indian sincerity in resolving disputes one hears so much about, is to achieve normalization with Pakistan, extract the maximum concessions from it in the economic and commercial spheres and stabilize peaceful conditions in the Subcontinent. It seems under the impression that it has found the present government in Islamabad a willing partner.” Many in Pakistan feel that the establishment fell prey to its own maneuvering, where before the visit, little or no homework was done. It is also believed that confused, unclear and foreign formulas were destined to meet this fate.

To a certain extent, the grievances of the Kashmiri leaders are valid. The Kashmir dispute was dealt by both the warring neighbors as purely a territorial dispute. Whenever, and at what ever level the matter was discussed, the role of the Kashmiri people was ignored. It had become purely an issue within the larger range of Pakistan-India bilateral relations. More than 80,000 Kashmiri lives have been lost and countless women raped, since the 1989 home grown revolt against the 700,000-strong Indian forces, but these gross human rights violations remained part of the bilateral dispute. On its own merit, these were never taken seriously by the Pakistani establishment.
Another rash act of the Pakistani military establishment came when in early 1990s, they inducted foreign militant elements in the genuine freedom struggle of the Kashmiris. Once the Soviet left Afghanistan, it was thought appropriate by the establishment to divert the Jahidies to Kashmir. That blemished the legitimate Kashmiri struggle and brought a bad name to the just cause. The international support soon dwindled and even Pakistan’s traditional allies refrained from supporting the Kashmiri cause. At the same moment, as a result of the Jahidi fallout, the Pakistani society suffered tremendously, in the shape of rising militancy and violence. Steve Coll, a scholar of Pakistan policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir writes that the “infrastructure needed to produce Jihadists proved corrosive for Pakistani society, a development not appreciated at that time by those who developed the strategy. As it turned out, a heavy price was paid for the reliance on groups whose members were deeply committed to Islamic fundamentalism. Often under official patronage, these groups began to penetrate Pakistani society.” The settlement of the Kashmir dispute will always be difficult, as stakes are very high for India, for Pakistan and for the freedom fighters. It has to be accepted that the lingering Kashmir dispute is highly complex as well as emotionally charged, for all the concerned parties. Moreover, the post-9/11 world, where the Americans are enforcing their agenda, makes even a genuine Kashmiri armed struggle for freedom more difficult. It is in this context that an assessment as well as solution for the Kashmir dispute is to be made.

There are certain compulsions that must be mentioned under which Pakistan has to operate. The days of Pakistan supporting the freedom fighters armed struggle, either tacitly or otherwise would not be accepted by the norms of the new International value system. The era of Jihadi groups is over. The manner in which these factions operated - links with the Talibans, Al-Quaida network and the sectarian killings in Pakistan are the reasons, which would make the armed struggle in Kashmir - a less relevant option. Nowhere in the future would the world community accept these groups as a valid means of struggle for the right of self determination. In the past, the Pakistani policy makers mishandled the Kashmir freedom struggle and today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course for freedom, where even the meaning of freedom has to be rewritten.

See online : http://www.selvesandothers.org/arti...

More voices urge co-opting Taliban: Some U.S. officials see inclusion as way to curb insurgency

San Francisco Chronicle
- Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Staff Writer
Sunday, October 15, 2006

Five years after the United States launched the war in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban from power, some U.S. political leaders and military commanders are saying that the only way to prevent chaos and violence from overwhelming the country is to co-opt the resurgent Islamic militia into the country's political system.

From Gen. David Richards, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., they are stepping up calls for a political approach to suppressing the insurgency.

Pointing to a deal Pakistan forged with pro-Taliban leaders last month, granting the militia control of North Waziristan province in return for a cease-fire, they are raising the idea that NATO could forge a similar agreement and bring an end to the suicide bombings and raids in Afghanistan.

"I think played rightly, with luck and good judgment I believe is there, this could set an example how we should deal with these problems," Richards, a British officer, said during a visit to Pakistan Tuesday.

Critics across the U.S. political spectrum have criticized the Pakistani deal in North Waziristan and lashed out at the idea of bringing the Taliban into the realm of Afghan politics.

When Frist called for the assimilation of "people who call themselves Taliban into a larger, more representative government" last week, Democratic legislators accused him of trying to appease the Taliban, which had provided a sanctuary for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda until the United States launched an offensive Oct. 7, 2001, to depose the radical militia.

"Sen. Frist now suggests that the best way forward in Afghanistan is to coddle the Taliban ... as if 9/11 had never happened," House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-San Francisco, said in a statement.

But many Afghanistan experts support such an approach, saying the Taliban cannot be defeated simply by military means because of their ethnic links and strong tribal support across huge swaths of the war-torn nation. "The likelihood that we see a decline in insurgency without addressing the concern of the tribal people is very low. There needs to be an integration of the Taliban," said Carl Robichaud, an expert on Afghanistan at the Century Foundation, a nonpartisan public policy research group in New York.

On a lower scale, negotiations with the Taliban or pro-Taliban elements are already under way in Afghanistan.

Last month, British commanders reached a cease-fire agreement with the Taliban via the local gathering of tribal elders, in the town of Musa Qala in the volatile southern Helmand province, Richards said. Under the agreement, the British troops pulled out of Musa Qala in return for the Taliban doing the same, with the elders serving as the guarantors of the cease-fire.

Hoping to enlist the support of tribal leaders in beating back the insurgency, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed last month to hold jirgas, or tribal councils, in the border areas of their respective countries. The jirgas -- open forums traditionally used to resolve conflicts by bringing the disagreeing parties to a consensus -- would involve leaders of Pashtun tribes, who share ethnic ties with the Taliban. No date for the councils has yet been announced.

"The question is, and it's an open question, could you get enough of a consensus on the part of more moderate voices that you could make progress on the whole insurrection," said William Cole, an expert on Afghanistan at the Asia Foundation in San Francisco.
Karzai's pro-Western government has been courting former Taliban officials for some time. In 2004, Karzai launched a reconciliation program, saying all but a core group of 150 militants wanted for human-rights violations would be able to rejoin the political process. About 2,300 former members of the Taliban and other Islamist insurgency groups have taken advantage of the program, Afghan officials said. It was "one of the most successful things the Afghan government has done," said Peter Bergen, an expert on Afghanistan at the New American Foundation and the author of "Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden."
Last spring, Karzai named Maulavi Abdul Hakim Munib, a former senior Taliban official, the governor of the southern Uruzgan province. Four former Taliban officials were elected to the parliament in 2005.

Critics of bringing the Taliban into Afghanistan's mainstream politics are oversimplifying the ties between the Taliban and al Qaeda, said Syed Hasnat, an expert on Afghanistan at the Middle East Institute.

The Taliban "might be bad people, they might have a distorted vision, but they are not al Qaeda," said Hasnat, a former head of the Middle East section for the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies. "The Taliban and al Qaeda must be seen as two separate entities."

But Cole, with the Asia Foundation, warned that the recent spike in suicide bombs and remote-controlled bombs suggests that the Taliban may have become so radicalized that "I don't know whether the strategy of trying to split the Taliban and al Qaeda is possible."

More than 3,000 people have been killed in Afghanistan so far this year, including more than 130 foreign troops. On Friday, a suicide bomber detonated his car near a NATO convoy in the southern Kandahar province, killing one NATO soldier and eight civilians and wounding nine others. On Monday, a remote-controlled mine killed five people, including the three top officials of the Khogyani district of the eastern Nangarhar province.

The Taliban is using such tactics not to cut off any possible negotiations, but because they are more effective, said Bergen. "The fact that they are using these tactics doesn't mean that you shouldn'tbe thinking about ways of dealing with them," said Bergen. Of the idea to bring more members of the Taliban into the government, he said: "I think it's an excellent one."
But simply engaging the Taliban politically is not enough, experts and officials say. The international community must increase efforts to stem the skyrocketing illegal opium trade, which helps finance the Taliban; speed up the pace of reconstruction; and help improve the image of the Afghan government, which currently has little power outside the capital.

"We can take on any military challenge that there is and be successful, but the real challenge in Afghanistan ... is how well the reconstruction mission, the international aid mission, is focused," said U.S. Marine Gen. James Jones, NATO's top operational commander, this month.
"There is a requirement to do more, to bring more focus, more clarity, more purpose and more results in a shorter period of time," he said at an event organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. "Fundamentally, this is the exit strategy for Afghanistan."

If the lives of Afghans show no visible improvements soon, more and more of them will support the Taliban, Richards warned.

"They will say, 'We do not want the Taliban but then we would rather have that austere and unpleasant life that that might involve than another five years of fighting,' '' he said.
E-mail Anna Badkhen at abadkhen@sfchronicle.com.
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©2006 San Francisco Chronicle

Experts say an Iraq pullout not enough to stop jihadists Both staying, leaving seen as problematic -

San Francisco Chronicle

Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Staff Writer

Thursday, September 28, 2006

Calling on the Bush administration again to withdraw troops from Iraq, Democratic lawmakers and critics of the war have seized on the bleak findings of a partially declassified intelligence report that concluded the war is helping cultivate new supporters for Islamist militants across the globe.
But experts on terrorism warn that extricating the United States from the increasingly unpopular war will not be enough to stop jihadists.